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ABSTRACT 
 
(WHEN) DO CONSUMERS PREFER UNCERTAINTY?  
CONSUMERS’ REACTIONS TO UNCERTAIN ADVICE AND UNCERTAIN 
PROMOTIONS 
 
Celia Gaertig 
 
Joseph P. Simmons 
 
Research has shown that, although uncertainty is often disliked, consumers 
sometimes seem to prefer uncertainty to certainty. The goal of this dissertation is to 
further understand the circumstances under which consumers prefer, rather than dislike, 
uncertainty across different domains. In Chapter 1, we investigate preferences for 
uncertainty in the domain of advice giving. There is a widespread belief that advisees 
prefer, and thus reward, advisors who offer certainty, even for events that are inherently 
uncertain. In contrast, we find that consumers do not dislike, and sometimes prefer, 
uncertain advice. Specifically, they do not dislike advisors who express uncertainty by 
providing ranges of outcomes, giving numerical probabilities, or saying one event is 
“more likely” than another. In addition, when faced with an explicit choice, people are 
more likely to choose an advisor who provides uncertain advice over certain advice. In 
Chapter 2, we extend our investigation to preferences for uncertainty in the domain of 
price promotions. We test why and when consumers may prefer an uncertain price 
promotion, such as a 10% chance to get a product for free, to an equivalent sure discount. 
We find that uncertain price promotions are relatively more effective only when the 
equivalent sure discounts feel small. Specifically, we find that uncertain promotions are 
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relatively more effective when the sure discounts are actually smaller, when the sure 
discounts are made to feel smaller by presenting them alongside a larger discount, and 
when the sure discounts are made to feel smaller by framing them as a percentage-
discount rather than a dollar amount. This suggests that people’s preferences for 
uncertainty are more strongly tethered to their perceptions of the size of the sure outcome 
than they are to their perceptions of the probability of getting the uncertain reward. Taken 
together, this dissertation challenges long-held beliefs about how uncertainty affects 
consumers’ judgments and decisions and highlights the circumstances under which 
consumers prefer, rather than dislike, uncertainty. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Uncertainty is ubiquitous in consumer decisions. Many of the most common and 
important consumer decisions, from home purchases to financial investments, involve 
uncertainty. Understanding how consumers react to uncertainty is therefore of utmost 
importance for marketers. Previous research demonstrates that uncertainty is often 
disliked (e.g., Gneezy, List, & Wu, 2006; Mislavsky & Simonsohn, 2017; Simonsohn, 
2009). However, recent research has also identified situations in which consumers seem 
to prefer uncertainty to certainty (e.g., Goldsmith & Amir, 2010; Mazar, Shampanier, & 
Ariely, 2016; Shen, Fishbach, & Hsee 2014). This work suggests that consumers may not 
always dislike, and sometimes prefer, uncertainty. In this dissertation, we further 
investigate the circumstances under which consumers prefer or dislike uncertainty across 
different domains. 
In Chapter 1, titled “Do People Inherently Dislike Uncertain Advice?”, we investigate 
preferences for uncertainty in the domain of advice giving. Consumers often ask for and 
rely on advice. Many psychologists and laypeople believe that advisees prefer, and thus 
reward, advisors who offer certainty. However, this belief comes, at least in part, from 
studies showing that consumers dislike advisors who express themselves without 
confidence. But do consumers dislike uncertain advice itself? In a series of eleven 
experimental studies (N = 4,806) across a variety of prediction domains (e.g., sports 
predictions, stock forecasts), we demonstrate that people do not inherently dislike 
uncertain advice. Specifically, we find that people do not dislike advisors who express 
uncertainty by providing ranges of outcomes, giving numerical probabilities, or saying 
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that one event is “more likely” than another. In addition, we find that, when asked to 
choose between two advisors, people are actually more likely to choose an advisor who 
incorporates uncertainty into his advice.  
The findings from Chapter 1 make important theoretical contributions to the literature 
by carefully disentangling the constructs of advisor confidence and advice certainty. 
These findings also have broad practical implications. Consumers often seek out and rely 
on advice, particularly in situations that involve uncertainty. Advisors should express 
themselves with confidence, but they do not need to provide false certainty. 
In Chapter 2, titled “Why (and When) Are Uncertain Price Promotions More 
Effective Than Equivalent Sure Discounts?”, we extend our investigation to preferences 
for uncertainty in the domain of price promotion. In a series of seven experimental 
studies (N = 11,238), we test why and when consumers may prefer uncertain price 
promotions, such as a 10% chance to get a product for free, to standard sure discounts. 
We find that uncertain price promotions are relatively more effective only when the 
equivalent sure discounts feel small. Specifically, we demonstrate that uncertain price 
promotions are relatively more effective when the sure discounts are actually smaller, or 
when the sure discounts are made to feel smaller by presenting them alongside a larger 
discount. Importantly, we also show that merely framing a sure price discount as a 
percentage rather than a dollar amount can make it feel smaller, thus making the 
uncertain promotion relatively more attractive.  
The findings from Chapter 2 are inconsistent with two leading explanations of 
consumers’ preferences for uncertain over certain promotions – diminishing sensitivity 
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and the overweighting of small probabilities – and suggest that people’s preferences for 
uncertainty are more strongly tethered to their perceptions of the size of the sure outcome 
than they are to their perceptions of the probability of getting the uncertain reward. These 
findings also have important practical implications, as they highlight when uncertain 
promotions can be effective and when they are not. 
Taken together, this dissertation challenges long-held beliefs about how uncertainty 
affects consumers’ judgments and decisions and highlights the circumstances under 
which consumers prefer, rather than dislike, uncertainty. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
DO PEOPLE INHERENTLY DISLIKE UNCERTAIN ADVICE? 
Celia Gaertig 
Joseph P. Simmons 
 
Published in Psychological Science in 2018. 
ABSTRACT 
 
Research suggests that people prefer confident to uncertain advisors. But do people 
dislike uncertain advice itself? In eleven studies (N = 4,806), participants forecasted an 
uncertain event after receiving advice, and then rated the quality of the advice (Studies 1-
7, S1-S2) or chose between two advisors (Studies 8-9). Replicating previous research, 
confident advisors were judged more favorably than advisors who were “not sure.” 
Importantly, however, participants were not more likely to prefer certain advice: They did 
not dislike advisors who expressed uncertainty by providing ranges of outcomes, 
numerical probabilities, or by saying that one event is “more likely” than another. 
Additionally, when faced with an explicit choice, participants were more likely to choose 
an advisor who provided uncertain advice over an advisor who provided certain advice. 
Our findings suggest that people do not inherently dislike uncertain advice. Advisors 
benefit from expressing themselves with confidence, but not from communicating false 
certainty. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Is it better for an advisor to be accurate or overconfident? Although there are 
seemingly obvious benefits to being accurate (e.g., a good reputation), many 
psychologists and laypeople believe that advisees prefer, and thus reward, advisors who 
offer certainty, even for events that are inherently uncertain. For example, in his book 
Thinking, Fast and Slow, Kahneman (2011) writes, “Experts who acknowledge the full 
extent of their ignorance may expect to be replaced by more confident competitors, who 
are better able to gain the trust of clients. An unbiased appreciation of uncertainty is a 
cornerstone of rationality—but it is not what people and organizations want” (p. 263). 
Similarly, in their book Superforecasting, Tetlock and Gardner (2015) write, “A 
confident yes or no is satisfying in a way that maybe never is” (p. 138). And, anecdotally, 
when we teach the perils of overconfidence to MBA students, they frequently counter 
with the claim that consumers have an inherent distaste for uncertainty, and that they 
must therefore give overconfident advice in order to be persuasive and successful. 
Many forecasters seem to have internalized this belief, often giving advice that is too 
certain. For example, people tend to place excessively narrow confidence intervals 
around their forecasts (Moore & Healy, 2008; Moore, Tenney, & Haran, in press; Soll & 
Klayman, 2004). This tendency to be overconfident is present in competitive market 
settings (Radzevick & Moore, 2011), and there is compelling evidence that social 
motives, such as the desire to appear credible to others, are drivers of overconfidence 
(Anderson, Brion, Moore, & Kennedy, 2012; Van Zant, 2017). 
Psychologists’ belief that people inherently dislike uncertain advice comes (at least in 
part) from studies showing that people dislike advisors who express themselves without 
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confidence. For example, research shows that people may rely on a “confidence 
heuristic,” according to which they infer that advisors who are more confident possess 
greater knowledge (Price & Stone, 2004). In addition, there is evidence that individuals 
who express confidence are judged as more competent by their peers and obtain higher 
status in their groups (Anderson et al., 2012). Indeed, to justify their claim that people 
inherently dislike “maybes” over more certain “yeses or nos,” Tetlock and Gardner 
(2015) cite research showing that “people trust more confident financial advisors over 
those who are less confident even when their track records are identical. And people 
equate confidence and competence, which makes the forecaster who says something has 
a middling probability of happening less worthy of respect” (p. 138).  
Thus, because there is compelling evidence that people dislike advisors who lack 
confidence, scholars have concluded that people dislike advice that lacks certainty. 
However, that need not be the case, as the confidence with which advisors communicate 
may be different from the certainty implied by what they say. For example, although 
recipients of advice may almost always dislike an advisor who speaks in a way that 
makes her seem unsure (e.g., “I’m not sure but I think the stock price will increase”), they 
may not dislike an advisor who confidently communicates uncertainty (e.g., “There is a 
60% chance that the stock price will increase”).  
Some research supports this notion. For example, research in settings that provide 
participants with rapid and unambiguous feedback (i.e., settings in which people can 
easily compare advisors’ forecasts to actual outcomes) shows that people prefer advisors 
who are calibrated rather than overconfident (Sah, Moore, & MacCoun, 2013; Tenney, 
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MacCoun, Spellman, & Hastie, 2007; Tenney, Spellman, & MacCoun, 2008). 
Additionally, research by Du, Budescu, Shelly, and Omer (2011) shows that people 
prefer financial forecasts that are imprecise in settings in which they believe imprecision 
to be warranted. Still, we do not know whether people tolerate uncertain advice in the 
absence of feedback, nor whether the tolerance for imprecise financial advice generalizes 
to other domains and other expressions of uncertainty.  
RESEARCH OVERVIEW 
Our research investigates whether advisors have an incentive to provide false 
certainty or merely an incentive to speak and act confidently. 
To investigate whether people inherently dislike uncertain advice, it is important to 
study events that are inherently uncertain rather than knowable. Indeed, people may 
dislike uncertain advice about events that are knowable not because of an inherent 
distaste for uncertainty, but because of an inherent distaste for obviously bad advice. For 
example, an advisor who says that there is 50% chance that Florida is south of New York 
will be universally untrusted, not because of an inherent distaste for uncertainty, but 
because being uncertain about something that is so easily knowable is truly diagnostic of 
incompetence. More generally, it is important to manipulate the uncertainty of the advice 
while holding the quality of the advice constant. This ensures that people do not like one 
advisor more than another simply because her advice is more accurate.  
Additionally, uncertain advice can take many forms, from imprecision (e.g., “The 
stock price will increase by 1-6%”) to statements of probability (e.g., “There is a 55% 
chance that the stock price will increase”) to non-numerical statements of uncertainty 
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(e.g., “The stock price is more likely than not to increase”). It is important for 
investigations of uncertain advice to investigate its various forms. After all, it could be 
that people do not inherently dislike uncertain advice, but that they object to particular 
forms of it.  
In eleven studies, we asked participants to forecast a future (and hence inherently 
uncertain) event after receiving advice, and we asked them to rate the quality of the 
advice (Studies 1-7 and S1 and S2) or to choose between two advisors (Studies 8 and 9). 
In all studies, we manipulated whether the advice itself was certain or uncertain, and we 
operationalized uncertain advice in seven different ways. In six of the first seven studies 
we also manipulated whether the advisor expressed confidence or said that s/he was not 
sure. In all studies, the quality of the advice was the same across conditions, allowing us 
to compare people’s evaluations of equally good uncertain versus certain advice. 
Consistent with previous research, we expected people to dislike advisors who said they 
were unsure about the advice they were giving. More important, however, was the 
comparison between people’s evaluations of certain and uncertain advice. Do people 
inherently dislike uncertain advice, or not?   
STUDIES 1-6 
In Studies 1-6, we asked participants to predict the outcomes of upcoming sporting 
events. Before each prediction, participants received and evaluated advice. The six 
studies followed a similar procedure, and so we describe them all at once. All of our 
studies were pre-registered, and the links to those pre-registrations can be found in the 
Appendix. The data and materials are available here: https://osf.io/ew34q/.  
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Method 
Participants 
We conducted Studies 1-6 using U.S. participants from Amazon.com’s Mechanical 
Turk (MTurk). We advertised Studies 1 and 2 as "a survey for NBA basketball fans" and 
Studies 3-6 as "a survey for Major League Baseball (MLB) fans." Participants received 
$1 for completing the study and they could earn up to an additional $1-4 for accurate 
forecasting performance. In Studies 1, 2, and 5, we decided in advance to recruit 300 
participants, and in Studies 3, 4, and 6, we decided in advance to recruit 400, 600, and 
900 participants, respectively. Our analyses included data from all participants who 
evaluated the advice for at least one of the games. This left us with final samples of 306, 
308, 411, 618, 305, and 916 in Studies 1-6, respectively. These samples averaged 33-35 
years of age and were 28-42% female. 
Procedure 
The six studies followed a similar procedure. In each study, participants were asked 
to predict the outcomes of a series of sporting events on the day on which the games were 
played. Participants in Studies 1 and 2 predicted NBA games, and participants in Studies 
3-6 predicted MLB games. For each study, we randomly selected eight games that began 
no earlier than 7 pm on the selected game day. We posted the study in the morning of the 
game day to ensure that data collection would be completed before the games started. For 
each game, participants were presented with the game’s start time, as well as the names 
of the home and visiting teams. For the MLB games, participants also saw the names of 
the teams' probable starting pitchers. In each study, the order of presentation of the games 
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was randomized between subjects, and the games were presented on the screen one at a 
time. 
For each of the games that participants were asked to forecast, we told them that, 
“You will receive advice to help you make your predictions. For each question, the 
advice that you receive comes from a different person.” Importantly, participants always 
received objectively good advice, based on data from well-calibrated betting markets. For 
each game, we independently manipulated the certainty of the advice and/or the 
confidence of the advisor, and the nature of these manipulations is described in detail 
below. Thus, across games, participants were exposed to different kinds of advice (i.e., 
certain or uncertain advice delivered by either an unsure or confident advisor).  
In Studies 1-4 and 6, we manipulated the confidence of the advisor by either 
preceding the advice with an expression of low confidence (e.g., “I am not sure, but I 
think that the Chicago Cubs will win the game”) or not (e.g., “The Chicago Cubs will win 
the game”). In Study 6, we also added a condition in which the advice was preceded by 
the statement, “I am very confident that…” In Study 5, the advice was always confidently 
stated. 
Apart from the minor procedural differences that we describe below, the main 
differences among the six studies were (1) the kind of prediction that participants were 
asked to make, and (2) the ways in which we manipulated advice uncertainty. Table 1 
displays which advice uncertainty manipulations were used in which studies, and shows 
an example of how the manipulations were phrased. 
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In Studies 1 and 2, participants were asked to predict how many points would be 
scored in a series of basketball games. For these predictions, we manipulated advice 
certainty vs. uncertainty by manipulating the precision of the advisor’s prediction. In the 
precise/certain conditions, the advisor forecasted an exact point total. In the 
imprecise/uncertain conditions, the advisor forecasted a range that was either 20 points 
wide (in the range 20 conditions of Studies 1 and 2) or 40 points wide (in the range 40 
condition of Study 2). 
In Studies 1, 3, 4, 5, and 6, participants were asked to predict which basketball or 
baseball team would win each game.1 For these predictions, we manipulated advice 
certainty vs. advice uncertainty by manipulating whether or not the advisor made a 
probabilistic prediction. In the certain conditions, the advisor simply said, “The 
[predicted team] will win this game.” Because there are many different ways for an 
advisor to make a probabilistic statement, across the studies we tried out five different 
phrasings, including three numerical (e.g., “There is a 57% chance that the Chicago Cubs 
will win this game” in the exact chance conditions) and two non-numerical (e.g., “The 
Chicago Cubs are more likely to win this game” in the “more likely” conditions) 
instantiations of uncertainty. See Table 1 for a complete description of these 
manipulations. 
                                                          
1 In Study 1, we asked participants to make both types of predictions, points scored and winners, separated 
into randomly ordered blocks of four games each. 
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Advice evaluation. After receiving the advice, we asked participants to rate its 
quality. Specifically, they indicated how knowledgeable, competent, and credible they 
perceived the advisor to be, how much they trusted the advisor, whether they would seek 
additional information or advice from the advisor in the future, and how persuasive and 
accurate the advice was (1-7 scales; 1 = “not at all” to 7 = “extremely”/“definitely”). We 
averaged these seven items to create a single measure of advice evaluation (all α's ≥ .93). 
Table 2 shows the exact wording of these questions. 
 
Table 2. Advice Evaluation Measures in Studies 1-6 
 
How knowledgeable is this advisor? (1 = not at all; 7 = extremely) 
How competent is this advisor? (1 = not at all; 7 = extremely) 
How credible is this advisor? (1 = not at all; 7 = extremely) 
How much do you trust this advisor? (1 = not at all; 7 = extremely) 
Would you seek additional information or advice from this person in the future? (1 = not at all; 7 = 
definitely) 
How persuasive is this advice? (1 = not at all; 7 = extremely) 
How accurate is this advice? (1 = not at all; 7 = extremely) 
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Incentivized predictions. We also asked participants to make their own predictions 
for each of the games and we incentivized them to be accurate. For questions that asked 
about total points scored in NBA games (Studies 1 and 2), the five participants who 
performed the best (i.e., whose predictions were the closest to the actual game outcomes 
across all games) received a $3 bonus. For questions that asked about the winner of a 
given game (Studies 1 and 3-6), those participants who predicted the outcome of a certain 
number of games correctly (all games for NBA games and 6 out of 8 for MLB games) 
received a $1 bonus. 
Sports knowledge. At the end of the survey, we presented participants with a set of 
six knowledge questions about the sport they were predicting. Specifically, we asked 
them to identify the teams of four different players and to identify which teams had the 
best and worst records at the time of the study. They were asked to answer these 
questions without looking up the answers. 
Demographics. At the end of the study, we assessed participants' age and gender. For 
Studies 3-6, we also asked participants to indicate their favorite MLB team. Finally, in 
Studies 3-6, we included other exploratory measures that are described in full in the 
Supplement. 
Results 
Analysis Plan 
We preregistered to analyze the data of each of these studies separately. However, 
presenting the results from each of these individual studies will make for a needlessly 
repetitive, tedious, and opaque results section. Thus, for ease of presentation, we decided 
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to merge the data from these six studies into one dataset, and to present the results all at 
once. The independent and dependent variables of the analyses we present in the text do 
not differ from our pre-registrations. The results of the pre-registered analyses for the 
individual studies are in the Online Supplement, and the means and standard deviations 
for each game are presented in Tables 3 and 4.  
Each participant who fully completed the study contributed eight observations to the 
dataset, one for each game that they predicted.2 We present the results in two sections, 
one containing the findings of the points scored predictions, for which uncertain advice 
was operationalized as imprecision, and the other containing the findings of the winner 
predictions, for which uncertain advice was operationalized as probabilistic statements. 
Within each section, we conducted separate regression analyses for each of the uncertain 
advice conditions. These analyses tested whether each particular form of uncertain advice 
was evaluated more positively or negatively than certain advice. Except for the analyses 
of percent confident advice, which was never presented in an “unsure” manner, we 
regressed participants’ advice evaluation on (1) the uncertain advice condition (-.5 = 
certain advice; +.5 = uncertain advice), (2) the advisor confidence condition (-.5 = unsure 
advisor; +.5 = confident advisor), and (3) the interaction between the two conditions. For 
example, in the analyses of the exact chance advice condition, we regressed participants’ 
advice evaluation on (1) the exact chance advice condition (-.5 = certain advice; +.5 = 
exact chance advice), (2) the advisor confidence condition (-.5 = unsure advisor; +.5 = 
confident advisor), and (3) the interaction between the two conditions. (For the “percent 
                                                          
2 Study 6 contained an error that caused the advice for one game to be displayed incorrectly, rendering its 
results invalid. We excluded this game from our analyses and from Table 4. 
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confident” condition, we omitted the advisor confidence condition and the interaction 
term because they were constants). All of our regressions included fixed effects for game, 
and clustered standard errors by participant to account for the non-independence of 
observations. We report the results of the interactions only when they are significant. The 
Online Supplement shows the full results.  
In addition, to test whether participants liked very confident advisors more than 
confident advisors in Study 6, we regressed participants’ advice evaluation on the very 
confident condition (-.5 = confident advisor; +.5 = very confident advisor). We again 
included fixed effects for game and clustered standard errors by participant.  
Main Analyses 
Points Scored Predictions: Uncertainty Operationalized as Imprecision 
Table 3 shows the results for each game. As predicted, and consistent with past 
research, there was a large and significant main effect of advisor confidence in these 
analyses, ts > 7.19, ps < .001: Advisors who said “I am not sure but…” were evaluated 
more negatively than advisors who expressed themselves confidently.  
More importantly, participants did not evaluate uncertain advice more negatively than 
certain advice. In fact, they evaluated advice in the form of 20-point ranges more 
positively than certain advice, b = .139, SE = .059, t(612) = 2.36, p = .019. In addition, 
they evaluated advice in the form of 40-point ranges no differently from certain advice, b 
= -.014, SE = .086, t(305) = -0.16, p = .872.  
Thus, these studies provide no evidence that people inherently dislike uncertain 
advice in the form of ranges. In fact, participants preferred advice that spanned a 20-point 
 16 
 
 
range to certain advice, and they did not significantly dislike uncertain advice that 
spanned a very large (40-point) range. While it is obviously the case that making the 
uncertain ranges even wider would eventually cause participants to disfavor it – for 
example, nobody would value advice such as, “The teams will score between 0 and 1,000 
points” – our results suggest that people do not inherently dislike uncertain range advice 
when the ranges are of a reasonable width. 
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Winner Predictions: Uncertainty Operationalized as Probabilistic Statements 
Table 4 shows the results for each game. As in the previous section, there was a large 
and significant main effect of advisor confidence in all regressions, ts > 16.42, ps < .001: 
Advisors who said “I am not sure but…” were evaluated more negatively than advisors 
who expressed themselves confidently. We also found, in Study 6, that advisors who 
preceded their advice by saying, “I am very confident that …” were evaluated more 
positively than advisors who did not express themselves with such high confidence, b = 
.132, SE = .039, t(914) = 3.37, p = .001. More important are the comparisons between 
participants’ evaluations of certain advice and uncertain advice, to which we now turn.  
Participants evaluated “exact chance” advice (e.g., “There is a 57% chance that the 
Chicago Cubs will win the game”) more positively than certain advice (e.g., “The 
Chicago Cubs will win the game”), b = .400, SE = .047, t(1,014) = 8.46, p < .001. 
Moreover, a significant interaction with advisor confidence, b = -.587, SE = .092, 
t(1,014) = -6.40, p < .001, revealed that participants evaluated “exact chance” advice 
significantly more positively than certain advice when the advisor said that s/he was 
unsure, b = .694, SE = .074, t(648) = 9.38, p < .001, and marginally more positively than 
certain advice when the advisor was confident, b = .106, SE = .056, t(960) = 1.89, p = 
.059. 
Participants also evaluated “approximate chance” advice (e.g., “There is about a 57% 
chance that Chicago Cubs will win the game”) more positively than certain advice, b = 
.269, SE = .043, t(1,306) = 6.29, p < .001. There was again a significant interaction with 
advisor confidence, b = -.649, SE = .078, t(1,306) = -8.33, p < .001. People evaluated 
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“approximate chance” advice more positively than certain advice when the advisor was 
unsure, b = .593, SE = .055, t(1,116) = 10.75, p < .001, but no differently from certain 
advice when the advisor was confident, b = -.057, SE = .060, t(1,133) = -0.95, p = .343.  
In Study 5, we introduced a percent confident condition, in which participants 
received confident advice in the form of “I am X% confident that…” We found that 
participants evaluated this advice the same as certain advice, b = .027, SE = .079, t(302) = 
0.34, p = .736.3 
The results of the “probably” condition were different, as participants did evaluate 
advice of the form, “The [predicted team] will probably win the game,” more negatively 
than they evaluated certain advice, b = -.236, SE = .038, t(1,023) = -6.14, p  < .001. This 
effect was significantly stronger when the advice came from an advisor who was 
confident, b = -.527, SE = .076, t(1,023) = -6.94, p  < .001. Specifically, participants 
evaluated this form of uncertain advice no differently from certain advice when the 
advisor was unsure, b = .028, SE = .053, t(951) = 0.53, p  = .596, but more negatively 
than certain advice when the advisor was confident, b = -.499, SE = .055, t(961) = -9.00, 
p  < .001. Thus, people do seem to dislike uncertain advice from a confident advisor who 
uses the word “probably”. 
This raises an important question: Do people inherently dislike all forms of uncertain 
advice that are non-numerical, or do they simply dislike it when advisors use the word 
“probably?”  
                                                          
3 The percent confident advice contained a typo: It read, “I am X% confident that the [predicted team] win 
this game.” 
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The results of the “more likely” condition suggest the latter. Participants evaluated 
advice of the form, “The [predicted team] is more likely to win the game,” no differently 
from certain advice, b = -.003, SE = .033, t(1,516) = -0.08, p = .940. These evaluations 
were not dependent on whether the advice came from an advisor who was “not sure,” b = 
-.110, SE = .067, t(1,516) = -1.64, p  = .101.  
In sum, we find that people do not inherently dislike uncertain advice that contains 
numerical probabilities and they also do not dislike uncertain advice that uses the words 
“more likely.” More specifically, we found that people evaluated “exact chance” advice 
and “approximate chance” advice more positively when the advisor said that s/he was 
unsure. When the advisor expressed confidence, people evaluated “exact chance” advice, 
“approximate chance” advice, and “percent confident” advice as no different from certain 
advice. 
 People’s evaluation of “more likely” advice did not depend on the confidence of the 
advisor; they evaluated “more likely” advice no differently from certain advice regardless 
of whether the advisor was confident or “not sure." For advice that used the word 
“probably,” the results were different: We found that people evaluated “probably” advice 
no differently from certain advice when the advisor said that s/he was unsure, but when 
the advisor expressed confidence, they evaluated “probably” advice more negatively than 
certain advice. 
Because Studies 1-6 were so similar, it is reasonable to consider whether these results 
hinge on specific aspects of their design. Here we consider two such aspects. First, in 
these studies, we manipulated the nature of advice within subjects (i.e., participants were 
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randomly assigned to different advice for each game they predicted). This should make 
participants more sensitive to the differences between certain and uncertain advice. For 
example, it could be that participants receiving “probably” advice dislike it only once 
they have been exposed to other types of advice. To see whether our effects would be 
different in a between-subjects design, we re-ran our analyses on the first game that 
participants predicted. These analyses have less power, but the size and direction of the 
effects are illuminating. As the two right columns of Table 5 show, participants did not 
significantly or substantially dislike any form of uncertain advice when it was the first 
piece of advice that they received.  
 
  
Second, all of these studies were conducted in the domain of sports, and so it is 
possible that people’s tolerance of uncertain advice is restricted to this domain. To test 
this, we conducted another study (N = 413; Study S1 in the Online Supplement), in which 
we asked participants to predict whether the high temperature of eight cities on a future 
date would be higher or lower than a particular temperature (e.g., “Will the high 
temperature in Denver, CO on October 21, 2017 be higher than 74 degrees Fahrenheit?”). 
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As in Studies 1-6, participants received advice for each of the forecasts that they made 
and we asked them to evaluate the advice. For each forecasting question, we manipulated 
whether the advisor was confident or unsure, and whether the advice was certain or 
uncertain (in the form of “more likely” advice). Participants evaluated confident advisors 
more positively than “unsure” advisors, b = 1.095, SE = .070, t(412) = 15.67, p < .001, 
but they did not evaluate “more likely” advice more negatively than certain advice, b = -
.014, SE = .049, t(412) = -.29, p = .771. Thus, the results of this weather forecasting study 
closely resemble those of the sports prediction studies, suggesting that our findings are 
not limited to the domain of sports.  
Additional Analyses 
Analyses of Advice Following 
In our investigation, we were chiefly interested in how people evaluate advice. Thus, 
we specified advice evaluation to be our critical dependent variable in all of our pre-
registrations. But we can also analyze the degree to which people followed the advice 
that they received. Were participants more or less likely to follow the advice when the 
advice was uncertain? 
To answer this question, we have to define what it means for a participant to “follow 
the advice.” For the winner predictions, this is easy: Following the advice means 
predicting the same winning team as the advisor. But for the points scored predictions, 
this is not obvious, because the advice in the certain conditions (e.g., “The teams will 
score 200 points”) is different from the advice in the range conditions (e.g., “The teams 
will score between 180 and 220 points”). Thus, for this example, a participant who 
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predicted 190 total points scored would be deviating from the certain advice (200 points), 
but his/her prediction would still fall within the uncertain range advice (180-200 points). 
Given this difficulty in defining what it means to "follow advice" for the points scored 
predictions, we restrict our analyses to the winner predictions, assessing whether or not 
participants predicted the same winning team as the advisor. 
As in the analyses of advice evaluations, we ran separate analyses for the different 
forms of uncertain advice. In each of these analyses, we regressed whether participants 
followed the advice (1 = they followed the advice; 0 = they did not follow the advice) on 
(1) the uncertain advice condition (-.5 = certain advice; +.5 = uncertain advice), (2) the 
advisor confidence condition (-.5 = unsure advisor; +.5 = confident advisor), and (3) the 
interaction between the two conditions. We included fixed effects for game and clustered 
standard errors by participant. (Again, the advisor confidence condition and the 
interaction term were necessarily omitted from analyses of the “percent confident” 
condition). We present OLS regressions here because the coefficients are easy to interpret 
(i.e., as percentage point differences between conditions); logistic regressions yielded 
nearly identical results. 
The results were fairly consistent across each type of uncertain advice. In all analyses, 
there was a significantly positive effect of advisor confidence, indicating that participants 
were more likely to follow the advice of confident advisors than advisors who said they 
were not sure, bs > .047, ts > 2.76 ps < .007. Across all of the analyses, there was only 
one significant difference in advice following between the certain and uncertain advice 
conditions: A significant positive effect of “exact chance” advice, b = .030, SE = .015, 
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t(1,014) = 2.01, p  = .044, indicated that participants were more likely to follow the 
advisor’s advice when it was uncertain rather than certain. There were no significant 
interactions between advisor confidence and advice uncertainty.  
Thus, consistent with the advice evaluation results, participants were no less likely to 
follow uncertain advice than to follow certain advice. 
Discussion  
These results suggest that people do not inherently dislike uncertain advice. They do 
not disvalue uncertain advice that comes in the form of ranges, numerical probabilities, or 
“more likely.” The only distaste for uncertainty that we observed was very specific: 
People seem not to like "probably" advice from a confident advisor when it is not the first 
piece of advice that they see. Otherwise, uncertain advice seems to go unpunished.  
In Studies 1, 3, 5, and 6, participants received uncertain advice in form of numerical 
probabilities. Exploratory analyses of our data suggest that people’s evaluation of 
numerical probabilistic advice may depend on the exact probability provided. For 
example, a close examination of Table 4 shows that, in the face of a confident advisor, 
participants judged probabilistic advice more negatively than certain advice for some of 
the games for which the advisor stated a probability very close to 50% (i.e., 51% or 
52%). In contrast, in the face of a confident advisor, participants sometimes judged 
probabilistic advice more positively than certain advice when the advisor stated a much 
higher probability (e.g., 73% and 83%). This suggests that people’s fondness for 
probabilistic advice may depend on whether the stated probability is perceived to be 
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sufficiently informative (e.g., sufficiently different from 50% for a binary decision). We 
tested this in Study 7. 
STUDY 7 
In Study 7, we again asked participants to predict the outcomes of upcoming sporting 
events and to evaluate the advice that they received prior to making each prediction. We 
focused our investigation on uncertain advice in the form of an “approximate chance” 
prediction that was rounded to the nearest 5% (e.g., “There is about a 60% chance that 
…”), and we manipulated across games what probability was contained in the uncertain 
advice.  
Study 7 also extends our investigation in other ways. First, we conducted this study in 
the laboratory. Second, we increased the incentives for accurate forecasting performance 
to ensure that participants would be sufficiently motivated to make accurate predictions 
and to consider the advice carefully. Third, we asked participants to predict how many 
hits two teams would accumulate in a given MLB game. Since this is an outcome people 
are less familiar with, they should be more desirous of good advice. Finally, we assessed 
participants’ advice evaluation by asking only about the advice itself, rather than also 
asking participants to judge the quality of the advisor.  
Method 
Participants 
We conducted Study 7 in the laboratory. (We also replicated Study 7’s design and 
results with an MTurk sample. We report this study in the Online Supplement as Study 
S2.) Participants completed the study as part of a ½-hour or 1-hour lab session for which 
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they received $5 or $10, respectively. In addition, participants could earn up to an 
additional $6 for accurate forecasting performance ($1 for each correct prediction). We 
pre-registered to conduct multiple batches of lab sessions until we obtained at least 300 
participants. We ended up running three batches of lab sessions in July and August of 
2017, resulting in a final sample size of 309 participants (average age: 27 years; 60% 
female).  
Procedure 
Participants predicted the outcomes of a series of MLB games prior to the games 
being played. For each batch of lab sessions, we selected 6 games that began no earlier 
than 7 pm on the last day of each lab session batch. For each game, participants were 
presented with the game’s start time, the names of the home and visiting teams, and the 
names of the teams' probable starting pitchers. They were asked to predict whether the 
two teams would combine to accumulate more than X hits in the game, where X differed 
for each game. The order of presentation of the games was randomized between subjects, 
and the games were presented on the screen one at a time.  
As in Studies 1-6, participants learned that they would receive advice to help them 
make their predictions. For each game, we then independently manipulated the certainty 
of the advice and the confidence of the advisor. We manipulated advice certainty vs. 
uncertainty by manipulating whether the advisor gave “approximate chance” advice (e.g., 
“There is about a 60% chance that the two teams will accumulate more than 15.5 hits.”) 
or not (e.g., “The two teams will accumulate more than 15.5 hits.”). We manipulated 
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advisor confidence by manipulating whether the advisor preceded their advice by saying 
“I am not sure, but I think that …” or not. 
We also manipulated across games whether the uncertain version of the advice 
offered a moderate probability (55% or 60%), an extreme probability (90 or 95%), or a 
probability in between (70% or 80%). Importantly, we computed the probabilities and hit 
thresholds so that participants received good advice for each game. First, we randomly 
assigned the six probabilities (55%, 60%, 70%, 80%, 90%, and 95%) to the six games. 
Second, using data from the 2015 MLB season, we could determine, for example, that 
roughly 60% of the games had more than 15.5 hits. Thus, for the game that was assigned 
the 60% probability, participants were asked to predict whether the two teams would 
accumulate more or fewer than 15.5 hits, and the advisor in the approximate chance 
advice condition said, “There is about a 60% chance that the two teams will accumulate 
more than 15.5 hits in this game.” The Online Supplement shows exactly which 
predictions participants made and what advice they received.  
Advice evaluation. After receiving the advice, we asked participants to rate the 
advice. We used a different set of items to assess advice evaluation in this study than we 
used in Studies 1-6. Specifically, participants indicated how persuasive, accurate, good, 
and reliable the advice was, and how smart it was to follow the advice (1-7 scales; 1 = not 
at all, 7 = extremely). We averaged these five items to create a single measure of advice 
evaluation (α = .94).  
Incentivized predictions. We also asked participants to make their own predictions 
for each of the games and we incentivized them to be accurate. Participants predicted 
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whether the two teams would accumulate more or fewer hits than the hit threshold 
assigned to each game. Participants received a $1 bonus for each correct prediction, and, 
since they made six predictions in this study, they could earn up to an additional $6.  
Motivation. We asked participants in this study to indicate how motivated they were 
to make accurate predictions (1 = not at all motivated, 7 = extremely motivated). 
Participants were made aware that their answer to this question would not affect their 
bonus payment. 
MLB knowledge. At the end of the survey, we presented participants with the same 
six knowledge questions about Major League Baseball that we used in Studies 1-6.  
Demographics. We also asked participants to indicate how closely they follow Major 
League Baseball (1 = “not at all closely” to 7 = “extremely closely”) and to indicate their 
favorite MLB team. Finally, we collected participants' age and gender. 
Results 
Analysis Plan 
Each participant contributed six rows to the dataset, one for each of the games that 
they predicted. We pre-registered to run two different regression analyses for this study, 
one investigating only the effects documented in Studies 1-6 and the other that also 
investigated whether extreme uncertain advice was more preferable to more moderate 
uncertain advice. Because the latter regression answers all of the questions we are 
interested in here, it is the one that we report.  
In what follows, we report the results from regressing the average advice evaluation 
on (1) the “not sure” condition (contrast-coded), (2) the approximate-chance condition 
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(contrast-coded), (3) the interaction between the “not sure” condition and the 
approximate-chance condition, (4) a mean-centered measure of the extremity of the 
uncertain advice, and (5) the interaction of this mean-centered measure of extremity and 
the approximate-chance condition. We clustered standard errors by participant. Because 
extremity varied across games, this regression did not include fixed effects for game. 
Main Analysis 
Consistent with the findings from Studies 1-6, there was a large and significant main 
effect of advisor confidence in this regression, b = .873, SE = .064, t(308) = 13.67, p < 
.001: Advisors who said “I am not sure but…” were evaluated more negatively than 
advisors who expressed themselves confidently.  
More importantly, participants did not evaluate “approximate chance” advice more 
negatively than certain advice. In fact, they evaluated “approximate chance” advice more 
positively than certain advice, b = .528, SE = .063, t(308) = 8.33, p < .001. The 
interaction between the advisor confidence condition and the “approximate chance” 
advice condition was significant as well, b = -.395, SE = .115, t(308) = -3.44, p = .001. 
The preference for “approximate chance” advice was stronger when the advisor was 
unsure, b = .725, SE = .085, t(305) = 8.51, p < .001, than when the advisor was confident, 
b = .330, SE = .086, t(305) = 3.85, p < .001. 
We also found a significant main effect of the extremity of the uncertain advice, b = 
.018, SE = .002, t(308) = 11.19, p < .001, and a significant interaction between this 
extremity measure and the approximate chance advice condition, b = .021, SE = .004, 
t(308) = 5.69, p < .001. As shown in Figure 1, this interaction indicates that people’s 
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preference for uncertain vs. certain advice was greater when the uncertain advice was 
associated with a larger probability.  
Additional Analyses 
Analyses of Advice Following 
To assess whether participants were more likely to follow some types of advice rather 
than others, we followed the same analytic approach as in the previous section, regressing 
whether a participant followed the advice (0 = did not follow; 1 = followed) on (1) the 
“not sure” condition (contrast-coded), (2) the approximate-chance condition (contrast-
coded), (3) the interaction between the “not sure” condition and the approximate-chance 
condition, (4) a mean-centered measure of the extremity of the uncertain advice, and (5) 
the interaction of this mean-centered measure of extremity and the approximate-chance 
condition. We clustered standard errors by participant. 
This analysis generated three significant main effects. First, participants were more 
likely to follow advice from a confident advisor than from an unsure advisor, b = .046, 
SE = .019, t(308) = 2.37, p = .018. Second, participants were more likely to follow 
uncertain advice than certain advice, b = .056, SE = .019, t(308) = 3.03, p = .003. Third, 
participants were more likely to follow advice for games associated with an extreme 
probability, b = .006, SE = .001, t(308) = 9.62, p < .001, probably because advice for 
these games was more unambiguously wise.  
Thus, participants in Study 7 not only judged uncertain advice more favorably than 
certain advice; they were also more likely to follow it. 
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Figure 1. Results of Study 7: Mean advice evaluation as a function of the probability associated 
with the uncertain advice, separately for confident and unsure advisors. People’s more positive 
evaluation of uncertain versus certain advice is more pronounced when the uncertain advice (and 
thus the event itself) is associated with a more extreme probability. This is true both when the 
advisor is confident (top panel) and when the advisor is unsure (bottom panel). Error bars 
represent plus or minus one standard error. 
 
Discussion 
Study 7’s results confirm those of Studies 1-6: People do not seem to inherently 
dislike uncertain advice. In fact, we found the opposite, as people judged uncertain advice 
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more favorably than certain advice, especially when the uncertain advice contained a 
more extreme probability. This result is interesting, particularly as past work on risky 
decision-making suggests that people are less sensitive to the differences among middling 
probabilities and more sensitive to the difference between certainty and some degree of 
uncertainty (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). Although that 
may be true about the perception of risky prospects, it does not appear to be true about 
the perception of advice. It seems that people prefer an advisor who correctly says that an 
event is about 95% likely over an advisor who simply says that the event will happen. 
So far, participants in our studies were simply asked to rate the quality of advice. 
Thus, we do not know whether people will tolerate uncertain advice when people are 
directly choosing between two advisors, as they sometimes have to do. To investigate 
this, we conducted Studies 8 and 9. 
STUDIES 8 AND 9 
 
In Studies 8 and 9, we asked participants to predict baseball games and stock prices. 
For each item, they received similar advice from two advisors, one who provided certain 
advice and one who provided uncertain advice, and indicated which advisor they 
preferred. The two studies were very similar and so we describe them together. 
Method 
Participants 
We conducted Studies 8 and 9 using U.S. participants from Amazon’s Mechanical 
Turk (MTurk). We advertised Study 8 as a “survey for Major League Baseball (MLB) 
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fans” and we advertised Study 9 as a “survey about making stock predictions.” 
Participants received $0.60 for completing each of the studies. In Study 8, participants 
could also earn an additional $1 for accurate prediction performance. We decided in 
advance to recruit 400 participants for both studies. We analyzed data from all 
participants who indicated their advisor preference for at least one of the advisor pairs. 
This left us with a final sample of 408 participants in each study. The samples were 47% 
and 41% female and averaged 35 and 34 years, respectively. 
Procedure 
The two studies followed a similar procedure. Participants saw a series of four 
prediction questions (about baseball in Study 8 or stocks in Study 9), and for each one 
they received advice from two advisors. The advisors always agreed in their forecasts, 
but they differed in their certainty: One of the two advisors provided certain advice and 
the other advisor provided uncertain advice. For each advisor pair, we manipulated 
whether the certain advice was presented first (by Advisor 1) or second (by Advisor 2). 
Before making their own prediction, participants were asked to indicate which advisor 
they preferred. In each study, the four prediction questions were presented on the screen 
one at a time in randomized order. The two studies differed with respect to (1) the 
prediction domain and (2) the ways in which we manipulated advice uncertainty. 
In Study 8, participants were asked to predict how many points would be scored in a 
series of baseball games. We randomly selected four games that were played on August 
5, 2016, and that began no earlier than 7 pm. As in Studies 1-6, we posted the study on 
the morning of the game day to ensure that data collection was completed before the 
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games started and we provided participants with details about each game. Participants 
also saw advice from two advisors. The advisor who provided certain advice simply 
stated that, “The [predicted team] will win this game.” The advisor who provided 
uncertain advice either provided approximate chance advice (e.g., “There is about a 67% 
chance that the Chicago Cubs will win this game”) or used the words “more likely” (e.g., 
“The Chicago Cubs are more likely to win this game”). We manipulated between subjects 
which two games featured an advisor who provided approximate chance advice versus 
“more likely” advice. As in our previous studies in the domain of sports, participants 
received objectively good advice in all of the experimental conditions, which was based 
on data from well-calibrated betting markets. 
In Study 9, participants were asked to predict the stock prices of four different 
companies. We randomly selected four companies from the 20 companies from the 
NASDAQ Stock Market with the largest market capitalization. Participants saw the name 
of the company and its stock symbol and were asked to predict whether the stock price of 
the company would be higher or lower in a year from the day the study was conducted. 
As in Study 8, participants saw advice from two advisors. The advisor who provided 
certain advice simply said that, “The stock price of [company] in a year will be higher 
[lower] than it is today.” The advisor who provided uncertain advice used the words 
“more likely” (e.g., “The stock price of Starbucks in a year is more likely to be higher 
than it is today”). Given that there is no objectively good advice for stock price 
predictions, we manipulated whether the two advisors predicted that the stock price 
would be higher versus lower in a year. 
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Dependent Measures 
Advisor choice. After receiving the advice, we asked participants to indicate which 
advisor they preferred. In Study 8, participants indicated their preference by answering, 
“From which of the two advisors would you prefer to receive advice for upcoming 
games,” and, in Study 9, participants indicated their preference by answering the 
question, “From which of the two financial advisors would you prefer to receive advice 
for future stock predictions?”  
Incentivized predictions. We also asked participants to make their own predictions. 
In Study 8, we incentivized participants to make accurate predictions by providing a $1 
bonus to all participants who predicted the winner of at least three of the four games 
correctly. Because in both studies the advisor who provided certain advice and the one 
who provided uncertain advice always agreed in their advice (i.e., they provided 
directionally consistent advice), analyses of participants’ own predictions could not tell 
us whether they more closely followed certain versus uncertain advice. Thus, we do not 
analyze participants’ own predictions. 
Knowledge. At the end of each study, we presented participants with questions aimed 
at assessing their knowledge about the domain for which they made predictions. In Study 
8, we assessed participants' knowledge about baseball by asking them the same six MLB 
knowledge questions that we used in Studies 3-6. In Study 9, we asked participants to 
self-report how much they know about stocks in general and about each of the four 
companies using 7-point scales that ranged from 1 = “nothing” to 7 = “a lot.” 
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Demographics. At the end of the study, we assessed participants' age and gender. In 
Study 8, we also assessed participants' favorite MLB team.  
Results 
We preregistered to analyze the data of the two studies separately. However, for ease 
of presentation, we decided to merge the two studies into one dataset and to report the 
results of the merged dataset. Otherwise, the analyses follow our pre-registration plan. 
We provide the item-by-item results in Tables 6 and 7 and we report the results from the 
pre-registered analyses for the individual studies in the Online Supplement. 
We conducted two separate regressions, one for the approximate chance advice 
condition (which we used only in Study 8) and one for the “more likely” advice condition 
(which we used in both Study 8 and Study 9). In each analysis, we regressed whether or 
not the participant chose Advisor 2 (1 = yes; 0 = no) on whether Advisor 2 provided 
uncertain or certain advice (1 = uncertain advice; 0 = certain advice). We included fixed 
effects for game/item and clustered standard errors by participant. We present the results 
from OLS regressions here because the coefficients are easy to interpret (i.e., as 
percentage point differences between conditions); logistic regressions yielded nearly 
identical results. 
In both regressions, we found a large and significantly positive effect of the uncertain 
advice condition, indicating that more participants preferred Advisor 2 when Advisor 2 
provided uncertain advice than when Advisor 2 provided certain advice. This was true 
both when the uncertain advice came in the form of approximate chance advice and in the 
form of “more likely.” When one advisor provided certain advice and the other 
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approximate chance advice, 82.4% of participants chose Advisor 2 when Advisor 2 
provided approximate chance advice, but only 16.2% of participants chose Advisor 2 
when Advisor 2 provided certain advice, b = .661, SE = .032, t(407) = 20.39, p < .001. 
When one advisor provided certain advice and the other “more likely” advice, 70.7% of 
participants chose Advisor 2 when Advisor 2 provided “more likely” advice, but only 
28.0% of participants chose Advisor 2 when Advisor 2 provided certain advice, b = .427, 
SE = .030, t(810) = 14.09, p < .001.  
Thus, as in Study 7, participants seemed to actually prefer advisors who provided 
uncertain advice to advisors who provided certain advice. It is possible that we observed 
this effect because participants who disagree with the advice perceive the uncertain 
advice to be less wrong than the certain advice. For example, if a participant believes that 
the Reds are going to beat the Pirates, but an advisor tells them that the Pirates are going 
to beat the Reds, the participant may prefer the advisor who says that the Reds might win 
rather than an advisor who implies that they definitely will not. To examine the viability 
of this explanation, we re-ran the analyses, restricting the sample to those instances in 
which the participant gave the same prediction as the advisor, and thus agreed with the 
advice. This did not impact the results. Even when analyzing only those who agreed with 
the advice, we found that participants in Studies 8 and 9 strongly preferred the uncertain 
advice to the certain advice (ps < .001).  
Together, these results demonstrate a strong preference for uncertain advice over 
certain advice when participants are faced with an explicit choice. 
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GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
In eleven studies, we found that people do not inherently dislike uncertain advice. We 
observed this in studies of sports, weather, and stocks. We observed this in studies that 
operationalized uncertain advice as imprecision, as statements of numerical probability, 
and as statements of non-numerical uncertainty. And we observed this in studies in which 
people directly evaluated the advice and in studies that asked people to choose between 
an advisor who provided certain advice versus one who provided uncertain advice. The 
N M N M
Approximate Chance Pirates* Reds 59% 103 80.6% 101 22.8%
Astros* Rangers 62% 103 85.4% 101 11.9%
Mariners* Angels 63% 101 82.2% 102 15.7%
Cubs* Athletics 67% 101 81.2% 103 14.6%
"More Likely" Pirates* Reds 59% 103 81.6% 100 21.0%
Astros* Rangers 62% 100 69.0% 103 22.3%
Mariners* Angels 63% 101 80.2% 103 18.4%
Cubs* Athletics 67% 101 73.3% 102 24.5%
Note. The actual winner of each game is marked with an asterisk (*).
Table 6. Study 8: Percentage of Participants Who Chose Advisor 2 by Game
When Advisor 2 Gave 
Uncertain Advice
When Advisor 2 Gave 
Certain AdvicePredicted 
Loser
Predicted 
WinnerUncertain Advice
Percentage of Participants Who Chose Advisor 2
Winning 
Probability
N M N M
Higher in a year Comcast 101 65.3% 101 25.7%
Starbucks 101 60.4% 101 28.7%
The Priceline Group 91 65.9% 110 30.0%
Qualcomm 88 72.7% 113 31.0%
Lower in a year Comcast 101 72.3% 99 32.3%
Starbucks 100 73.0% 100 31.0%
The Priceline Group 111 66.7% 90 33.3%
Qualcomm 114 68.4% 88 39.8%
Table 7. Study 9: Percentage of Participants Who Chose Advisor 2 by Item
When Advisor 2 Gave 
"More Likely" Advice
CompanyAdvice Direction
When Advisor 2 Gave 
Certain Advice
Percentage of Participants Who Chose Advisor 2
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only reliable distaste for uncertainty that we observed was that people seem to not like it 
when confident advisors use the word “probably,” and even this effect was not evident 
when the word “probably” was used by the first advisor that they saw. Taken together, 
our results challenge the belief that advisors need to provide false certainty for their 
advice to be heeded. Advisors do not have a realistic incentive to be overconfident, as 
people do not judge them more negatively when they provide realistically uncertain 
advice. 
Although we investigated various forms of uncertain advice in our studies, we cannot 
conclude that people are never less tolerant of uncertain advice. We can speculate that 
people may prefer certain advice in domains in which they expect to receive certain 
advice, or in circumstances in which they want advisors to be persuasive rather than 
informative. For example, a manager who wants to hire a particular job candidate may 
prefer to hear that that candidate is definitely the best one rather than probably the best 
one. These idiosyncratic possibilities aside, our investigation should lay to rest the belief 
that people are generally and inherently intolerant of uncertain advice.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
WHY (AND WHEN) ARE UNCERTAIN PRICE PROMOTIONS MORE EFFECTIVE 
THAN EQUIVALENT SURE DISCOUNTS? 
Celia Gaertig 
Joseph P. Simmons 
 
ABSTRACT 
Past research suggests that offering customers an uncertain promotion, such as an X% 
chance to get a product for free, is always more effective than providing a sure discount 
of equal expected value. In seven studies (N = 11,238), we find that uncertain price 
promotions are more effective than equivalent sure discounts only when those sure 
discounts are or seem small. Specifically, we find that uncertain promotions are relatively 
more effective when the sure discounts are actually smaller, when the sure discounts are 
made to feel smaller by presenting them alongside a larger discount, and when the sure 
discounts are made to feel smaller by framing them as a percentage-discount rather than a 
dollar amount. These findings are inconsistent with two leading explanations of 
consumers’ preferences for uncertain over certain promotions – diminishing sensitivity 
and the overweighting of small probabilities – and suggest that people’s preferences for 
uncertainty are more strongly tethered to their perceptions of the size of the sure outcome 
than they are to their perceptions of the probability of getting the uncertain reward. 
 42 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
It is hard to go a day without being exposed to a price promotion, and that is because 
price promotions are among the most important tools in the marketer’s arsenal. The vast 
majority of price promotions come in the form of sure discounts, meaning that consumers 
know for sure what price discount they will receive with their purchase. However, 
retailers sometimes introduce uncertain price promotions, those that offer a probabilistic 
discount. For example, several companies, including Dell, Banana Republic, Glasson, 
and hotels.com, have launched mystery coupon campaigns that offer consumers an 
unknown discount on a purchase. Some of those coupons offer consumers 100% off of 
the sale price, thus giving them the product for free. Similarly, some companies, such as 
Media Markt, have offered a 100% discount to every 10th or 100th customer (see also 
Mazar, Shampanier, & Ariely, 2017). 
Given that these two types of price promotions co-exist in the marketplace, it is 
natural to ask which is better: offering consumers a sure discount on a purchase, or 
offering them an X% chance to get the product at an even greater discount? Although the 
ubiquity of sure discounts might lead one to infer that they are more effective, recent 
research on this question suggests the opposite: Consumers seem to prefer uncertain 
promotions to equivalent promotions that offer a discount or reward with certainty 
(Goldsmith & Amir, 2010; Mazar et al., 2017; also see Shen, Fishbach, & Hsee, 2014). In 
an important paper, Mazar, Shampanier, and Ariely (2017) report the results from several 
experiments in which they found that people were more likely to purchase a product 
when it came with a chance to get it for free than when it came with a sure price discount 
 43 
 
 
of equal expected value. This suggests that marketers should make more use of uncertain 
promotions than they currently do. 
Mazar, Shampanier, and Ariely’s (2017) explanation for why people tend to prefer 
uncertain price promotions to equivalent sure discounts hinges on consumers’ 
diminishing sensitivity to increasing prices, the fact that consumers are less sensitive to 
changes in price as the price increases. For example, consumers tend to value saving $10 
on a $20 purchase more highly than they value saving $10 on a $2,000 purchase. This 
basic psychophysical fact is captured in Tversky and Kahneman’s (1981) classic jacket-
and-calculator experiment, in which they found that more people were willing to travel 
20 minutes to receive $5 off of a $15 calculator than to receive $5 off of a $125 jacket.  
To understand why diminishing sensitivity to prices would result in a preference for 
uncertain price promotions over equivalent sure discounts, let’s consider a product 
originally priced at $10. Imagine that this product is offered either with a sure discount of 
20% off or with a 20% chance to get it for free (hereafter called the “chance-for-free 
promotion”). Importantly, these two promotions offer the same expected value for the 
price of the product, namely $8. According to diminishing sensitivity, the value of a 
price, v(x), is equal to xα, where α  < 1. Prior research suggests that α  = .88 in some 
contexts (Prelec, 1998), so we will use that value for this example.  
In this example, the value of the sure discount is equal to the value of the original 
price ($10.88 = $7.59) minus the value of the discounted price ($8.88 = $6.23), which is 
$1.36. The value of the chance-for-free promotion is equal to the value of the original 
price ($10.88 = $7.59) minus the value of the original price times the probability of paying 
 44 
 
 
the original price ($7.59(.80) = $6.07), which is $1.52. Thus, the chance-for-free 
promotion ($1.52) is valued more highly than the sure discount ($1.36).  
Indeed, it is generally true that when a sure discount and a chance-for-free promotion 
result in the same expected value for a product, and the chance-for-free promotion offers 
a p chance to get the product for free, then diminishing sensitivity means that the value of 
the chance-for-free promotion will always be higher than the value of the sure discount 
(Mazar et al., 2017). This is because, under diminishing sensitivity, the discounted price 
will always feel larger than a (1-p) chance of getting the regular price. A diminishing 
sensitivity explanation of consumers’ price promotion preferences therefore predicts that 
consumers will always prefer a chance-for-free promotion to a sure discount of equal 
expected value.4 
In this article, we provide evidence for a different explanation for why people would 
prefer an uncertain chance-for-free promotion to a sure discount of equal expected value, 
one that does not predict that people will always prefer chance-for-free promotions to 
sure price discounts. Specifically, we suggest that a chance-for-free promotion will be 
more effective than a sure discount of equal expected value only when the sure discount 
                                                          
4 Mazar, Shampanier, and Ariely (2017) also considered a version of their diminishing sensitivity account 
that incorporates the probability weighting function of prospect theory. This account makes two unique 
predictions: (1) consumers will be more likely to prefer uncertain promotions over sure discounts when the 
probability of obtaining the uncertain promotion is smaller, and (2) consumers will prefer the uncertain 
promotion unless the probability of obtaining the uncertain promotion is quite large (e.g., greater than .6). 
Although their findings do not definitively rule out the operation of probability weighting, they do seem to 
be more consistent with an account of diminishing sensitivity that does not incorporate probability 
weighting. Indeed, Mazar, Shampanier, and Ariely (2017) conclude that “our findings may be better 
explained by diminishing sensitivity to prices without weighted probabilities” (p. 257). Thus, we focus here 
on what happens under diminishing sensitivity in the absence of probability weighting. 
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feels trivially small. When the sure discount feels large, consumers will be more likely to 
prefer the sure discount to an equivalent chance-for-free promotion.  
The notion that the size of the sure discount is likely to matter for people’s choices is 
in line with previous work on the “peanuts effect” (Markowitz, 1952; Prelec & 
Loewenstein, 1991; Weber & Chapman, 2005). Although decision-makers are generally 
risk averse (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), it has been demonstrated that risk-aversion 
decreases with decreasing monetary amounts (Prelec & Loewenstein, 1991; Weber & 
Chapman, 2005). That is, decision-makers are more willing to take risks when playing for 
smaller monetary amounts, an effect termed the “peanuts effect.” Nevertheless, our 
hypothesis does not follow directly from past work on the peanuts effect. Whereas 
previous research suggests that the psychology of “peanuts” applies only to objectively 
minuscule amounts (e.g., cents), we will show that it applies to any amount that seems 
small within the context in which it is considered. For example, we will suggest that a 
discount of $11 can feel like almost nothing at all in the context of a very large amount, 
and that in such cases, people will forego that discount in order to pursue a chance at a 
larger discount.  
Although our hypothesis is straightforward, its implications are far-reaching, both 
theoretically and practically. Theoretically, our hypothesis implies that diminishing 
sensitivity and related theories cannot explain consumers’ preferences for uncertain 
promotions. Practically, it suggests that any manipulation that makes a sure discount 
seem small will increase the relative effectiveness of a chance-for-free promotion. Thus, 
our account suggests that chance-for-free promotions will not only be more effective 
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when sure discounts are objectively small, but that they will also be more effective when 
objectively sizable sure discounts are considered within a context that makes them feel 
small or framed in way that makes them feel small. For example, we will show that how 
you frame discounts – as percent reductions vs. dollars off – can change how big a sure 
discount feels, and thus whether consumers prefer a chance-for-free promotion or the 
sure discount. In so doing, we will demonstrate that chance-for-free promotions are not 
always more effective than equivalent sure discounts, and we will delineate the 
conditions under which they are.  
RESEARCH OVERVIEW 
Our research investigates whether consumers’ preferences for a chance-for-free 
promotion over a sure discount are influenced by how small or large the sure discount 
feels. We focused on investigating uncertain promotions that offered a chance to get a 
product for free because such promotions have been a primary focus of prior research 
(Mazar et al., 2017), and because consumers (and survey takers) are likely to easily 
understand them. For example, it is probably easier for consumers to compute the 
expected value of a 10% chance of getting a $400 product for free than to compute the 
expected value of a 50% chance of getting a $400 product at an 80% discount.  
Across seven studies, we used different strategies to make a sure discount be/feel 
large or small, including (1) varying the percentage associated with it (e.g., 10% vs. 1%), 
(2) varying the price of the product (e.g., $480 vs. $48), (3) varying whether or not the 
discount was presented in the context of a larger discount, and (4) varying whether the 
sure discount was presented as a dollar amount or a percentage. In line with prior 
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research, we measured consumers’ preferences either by assessing whether they chose a 
promoted product over competing products or by directly asking them to choose between 
an uncertain promotion and a sure discount for a given product.  
We report all of our measures, manipulations, exclusions, and how we determined our 
sample sizes. We pre-registered all of our studies, and we provide the link to the pre-
registrations in the Appendix. All of our data and materials are available at this link: 
https://tinyurl.com/UncertainPromotions. 
STUDIES 1A AND 1B 
 
In Studies 1a and 1b, we asked participants to choose among three hotels, one of 
which came with a promotion. We manipulated whether the promotion was certain or 
uncertain by manipulating whether it came in the form of a sure discount or a chance-for-
free promotion, and we manipulated whether the sure discount was small or large by 
manipulating the percentage associated with the promotion. For example, in the “1%” 
condition of Study 1a, participants either learned that the $210 hotel was offering a sure 
discount of 1% off of the original price of the hotel (i.e., $2.10 off) or that it was offering 
a 1% chance to get the hotel booking for free. Similarly, in the “10%” condition of Study 
1a, participants either learned that the $210 hotel was offering a sure discount of 10% off 
of the original price of the hotel (i.e., $21 off) or that it was offering a 10% chance to get 
the hotel booking for free. We expected that participants would be more likely to forego 
the sure discount when it was relatively small ($2.10) than when it was relatively large 
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($21), and thus that the chance-for-free promotion would be relatively more effective in 
the “1%” condition than in the “10%” condition.  
Method 
Participants 
We conducted Studies 1a and 1b using U.S. participants from Amazon.com’s 
Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Participants received $0.30 for participation. In Studies 1a 
and 1b, we decided in advance to recruit 1,500 and 2,100 participants, and we wound up 
with final samples of 1,502 and 2,039 participants, respectively.5 The final sample for 
each study included all participants who indicated which hotel they would choose. As 
pre-registered, in Study 1b, we kept only the first response from IP addresses that 
appeared more than once in the dataset (resulting in 32 exclusions), and we excluded any 
data from participants whose IP addresses were identical to those in Study 1a (31 
participants). The final samples of Studies 1a and 1b averaged 37 and 36 years of age and 
were 56% and 53% female, respectively. 
Procedure 
In each of Studies 1a and 1b, we asked participants to imagine that they were 
choosing among three hotels for an upcoming trip to Chicago. We presented participants 
                                                          
5 We have heard about recent cases in which reviewers criticized studies for having samples that were 
ostensibly too large. We have two things to say about this. First, samples simply cannot be too large, as the 
false-positive rate of a statistical test is unchanged by how large the sample size is (Simmons 2013). That 
is, in the presence of a truly null effect, a significant result will emerge only 5% of the time, regardless of 
how small or large the sample is. Large samples increase the precision of effect size estimates; they do not 
increase false-positive rates, and they do not alter the size of the effect. Second, although the samples we 
used in these studies will appear large to some readers, they are arguably not large enough. To have 80% 
power to detect a fairly large difference in choice shares between conditions on the order of 45% vs. 55%, 
you need to have more than 600 per cell. To have 80% power to fully attenuate this effect in a 2 x 2 
between-subjects design, you need about 1,200 per cell, or 4,800 participants in total. That is why our 
samples are so large in these studies.  
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with screenshots of each of the three hotels from an online booking website (see Figures 
2 and 3). Each screenshot showed a picture of the hotel, its name, price, address, how far 
it was from downtown Chicago, as well as its average rating, including the number of 
reviews the hotel had received. In Study 1b, the screenshots also showed when each hotel 
was last booked. The hotels for each study were similar in price and formed a realistic 
choice set. For Study 1a, participants saw three hotels priced at $210, $209, and $200, 
and for Study 1b, participants saw three hotels priced at $90, $89, and $84. In each study, 
the three hotels were presented to participants in descending order of price, and the hotel 
for which we manipulated the promotion was presented first in the choice set (and thus 
was the highest-priced hotel before applying the discount). 
Participants learned about the promotion via a note that appeared above the hotel 
screenshots (see Figures 2 and 3). Participants in Study 1a were randomly assigned to 
either a No Discount baseline condition or to one of four promotion conditions from a 2 
(promotion certainty: certain vs. uncertain) x 2 (promotion percentage: 1% vs. 10%) 
between-subjects designs. In Study 1b, we included an additional percentage of 5%, thus 
leading to seven conditions in total for that study.  
In both studies, we manipulated whether the promotion was certain or uncertain by 
manipulating whether the promoted hotel came with a sure discount of X% or with an 
X% chance of the booking being entirely free (hereafter called the “chance-for-free 
promotion”). For example, in Study 1b, the note for the sure-discount condition said, “All 
rooms booked in the next hour will get an X% discount and that discount is not reflected 
in the price below,” and the note for the chance-for-free promotion said, “All rooms 
 50 
 
 
booked in the next hour will have an X% chance of being entirely free.” The percentage 
X associated with the promotions was 1% or 10% in Study 1a and 1%, 5%, or 10% in 
Study 1b. Table 8 displays the exact wording of the manipulations in both studies. 
Participants were asked to indicate which of the three hotels they would choose, and 
we measured whether or not participants chose the promoted hotel (1 = they chose the 
promoted hotel; 0 = they chose one of the other two hotels). At the end of the study, we 
assessed participants’ age and gender. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Stimulus presented in Study 1a (uncertain-promotion condition). 
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Figure 3. Stimulus presented in Study 1b (uncertain-promotion condition). 
 
 
Table 8. Wording of the manipulations used in Studies 1a and 1b.
Sure Discount Chance to Get For Free
1a "Buckingham" $210 
Note: The Buckingham is offering a 10% 
discount to reservations made in the next 
hour and that discount is not reflected in 
the price below.
Note: The Buckingham is offering a 
promotion where all rooms booked in the 
next hour have a 10% chance of being 
entirely free.
1b "Ramada Plaza" $90 
Note: The Ramada Plaza is offering a 
promotion. All rooms booked in the next 
hour will get a 10% discount and that 
discount is not reflected in the price 
below.
Note: The Ramada Plaza is offering a 
promotion. All rooms booked in the next 
hour will have a 10% chance of being 
entirely free.
Price of the 
Promoted HotelStudy
Example Wording of the Manipulations
Notes.  In Study 1a, we manipulated the percentage associated with the promotion to be 1% or 10%, and, in Study 1b, we manipulated 
it to be 1%, 5%, or 10%. 
Name of the 
Promoted Hotel
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Results and Discussion 
Comparing the promotion conditions to the No Discount condition 
Following our pre-registration, we first tested whether participants’ likelihood of 
choosing the promoted hotel in each of the promotion conditions differed significantly 
from the No Discount baseline condition. We ran separate regression analyses for Studies 
1a and 1b. In each analysis, we regressed whether participants chose the promoted hotel 
(1 = they chose the promoted hotel; 0 = they chose one of the other two hotels) on each of 
the promotion conditions.6 
Table 9 shows what percentage of participants chose the promoted hotel in each 
condition. In Study 1a, each of the four promotion conditions significantly differed from 
the No Discount condition (all ps < .001). In Study 1b, five of the six promotion 
conditions significantly differed from the No Discount condition (ps ≤ .001), though the 
1% Sure Discount condition did not (p = .705). Thus, offering a promotion was generally 
effective in our studies. 
Main analyses 
As pre-registered, for our main analyses, we dropped the No Discount baseline 
condition and focused on the promotion conditions to test whether the certainty of the 
promotion and the percentage associated with it influenced participants’ likelihood of 
choosing the promoted hotel. We ran separate regression analyses for each of Studies 1a 
and 1b. In Study 1a, we regressed whether participants chose the promoted hotel (1 = 
                                                          
6 In all of our studies that used choice as a dependent variable, we pre-registered to analyze the data using 
OLS regressions rather than logistic regressions, because the two analyses produce nearly identical results 
and because OLS coefficients are easier to interpret (i.e., as the percentage-point difference between 
conditions). In only one case in this paper (specified in Study 1b) did the use of logistic regression change 
the significance of a result. 
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they chose the promoted hotel; 0 = they chose one of the other two hotels) on (1) the 
promotion certainty condition (contrast-coded), (2) the percentage condition (contrast-
coded), and (3) their interaction. In Study 1b, we regressed whether participants chose the 
promoted hotel (1 = they chose the promoted hotel; 0 = they chose one of the other two 
hotels) on (1) the promotion certainty condition (contrast-coded), (2) the “5%” condition 
(contrast-coded), (3) the “10%” condition (contrast-coded), (4) the interaction between 
the promotion certainty condition and the “5%” condition, and (5) the interaction 
between the promotion certainty condition and the “10%” condition.  
In Study 1a, in which the promoted hotel was priced at $210, participants were more 
likely to choose the promoted hotel when it came with a chance-for-free promotion than 
when it came with a sure discount, b = .061, SE = .027, t(1,200) = 2.25, p = .025. 
Participants were also more likely to choose the promoted hotel when the percentage 
associated with the promotion was 10% than when it was 1%, b = .199, SE = .027, 
t(1,200) = 7.29, p < .001. However, a significant interaction, b = -.176, SE = .054, 
t(1,200) = -3.22, p = .001, revealed that the chance-for-free promotion only made people 
more likely to choose the promoted hotel in the “1%” condition, b = .149, SE = .036, 
t(598) = 4.12, p < .001. In the “10%” condition there was a slight and nonsignificant 
tendency for the sure discount to be more effective than the chance-for-free promotion, b 
= -.027, SE = .041, t(601) = -.65, p = .515. That is, for a hotel priced at $210, people 
seem to be indifferent between receiving a sure discount of 10% ($21) on their booking 
or a 10% chance to get the booking for free. However, when the percentage is 1% and 
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thus the sure discount is small ($2.10), the chance-for-free promotion is more effective 
than the sure discount.  
In Study 1b, in which the promoted hotel was priced at $90, we also found that 
participants were more likely to choose the promoted hotel when it came with a chance-
for-free promotion than when it came with a sure discount, b = .069, SE = .017, t(1,745) 
= 4.16, p < .001. Furthermore, participants were more likely to choose the promoted hotel 
when the percentage associated with the promotion was 10% than when it was 1%, b = 
.167, SE = .027, t(1,745) = 6.16, p < .001, and when it was 5% than when it was 1%, b = 
.092, SE = .027, t(1,745) = 3.39, p = .001. Neither the interaction between the discount 
certainty condition and the “10%” condition (p = .429), nor the interaction between the 
discount certainty condition and the “5%” condition (p = .689) was significant.7 
However, looking at Study 1b’s results more closely, we see a trend toward the chance-
for-free promotion being more effective as the size of the sure discount decreased (see 
Table 9). Indeed, although the 1% chance-for-free promotion was significantly more 
effective than the sure discount of $0.90, the 10% chance-for-free promotion was not 
significantly more effective than the sure discount of $9.  
Taken together, the results of Studies 1a and 1b suggest that chance-for-free 
promotions will be more effective when the size of the sure discount is smaller. Of 
course, manipulating the size of the sure discount by manipulating the percentage 
associated with the promotion raises the question of whether the effect we observed is 
                                                          
7 Using logistic regression, the interaction between the discount certainty condition and the “10%” 
condition is significant, b = .281, SE = .154, t(1,745) = -2.31, p = .021, and the interaction between the 
discount certainty condition and the “5%” condition is marginally significant, b = .380, SE = .217, t(1,745) 
= -1.70, p = .090. 
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driven by the perceived size of the sure discount, or by people’s greater preference for 
gambles that offer smaller probabilities (i.e., via overweighting of small probabilities; 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).8 If the effect is driven by people’s perceptions of the size 
of the sure discount, then a 10% chance-for-free promotion should be relatively more 
effective than an equivalent sure discount of 10% when the original price of the product 
is small than when the original price of the product is large, because the absolute sure 
discount will be smaller when the original price is smaller. We tested this in Study 2. 
 
STUDY 2 
 
Study 2 was very similar to Studies 1a and 1b. However, in this study, instead of 
manipulating the percentage associated with the promotions, we manipulated the size of 
the sure discount by manipulating the price of the hotel for which the discount was 
offered. 
                                                          
8 We will rule out this alternative in the subsequent studies (including Study 2), but it is worth mentioning 
that there really is not good evidence that people generally overweight small probabilities. First of all, 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) themselves suggested that although sometimes people will overweight 
small probabilities, they will sometimes edit them down to zero (and thus underweight them). Second, as 
mentioned in Footnote 1, Mazar, Shampanier, and Ariely (2017) results were at least somewhat 
inconsistent with people overweighting small probabilities. Third, Green, Lee, and Rothschild (2018) have 
recently shown that what was considered one of the best real-world examples of people’s tendency to 
overweight small probabilities – the favorite-longshot bias in horse betting – is actually caused by bettors’ 
reliance on biased information that the race tracks give them.   
Table 9. Results for Studies 1a and 1b.
Sure
Discount
Chance to Get 
For Free
1% $2.10 20.2% 35.1%
10% $21 48.8% 46.2%
1% $0.90 3.8% 12.3%
5% $4.50 11.5% 18.4%
10% $9 17.9% 23.2%
Notes. In Studies 1a and 1b, 7.6% and 2.7% of participants, respectively, chose the promoted hotel in the No Discount condition.
Pairwise ComparisonStudy
Price of the 
Promoted 
Hotel
b  = -.027, SE = .041, p  = .515
b = .053, SE = .034, p  = .115
b = .069, SE = .029, p  = .019
b  = .149, SE  = .036, p  < .001
b  = .085, SE  = .022, p  < .001
Percentage of Participants Who 
Chose the Promoted HotelPercentage 
Associated with 
the Promotion
1a
1b $90 
$210 
Size of the 
Sure 
Discount
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Method 
Participants 
We conducted Study 2 using U.S. participants from Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk 
(MTurk). Participants received $0.50 for participation. We decided in advance to recruit 
2,400 participants for this study, and we wound up with a final sample of 2,302 
participants (average age = 37 years; 55% female). The final sample included all 
participants who indicated their choice, but, as pre-registered, we kept only the first 
response from IP addresses that appeared more than once in the dataset (resulting in 46 
exclusions), and we excluded any participants whose IP addresses were identical to those 
of participants in Studies 1a and 1b (69 participants).  
Procedure 
The general procedure of this study was very similar to the procedure of Studies 1a 
and 1b. We presented participants with screenshots of three hotels and asked them to 
indicate which hotel they would choose. In this study, participants imagined that they 
were choosing among three hotels for a trip to the Jersey Shore (see Figure 4). As in 
Studies 1a and 1b, the hotel that appeared first in the choice set was the promoted hotel. 
We manipulated both the promotion type and the price of the promoted hotel. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions from a 2 (promotion 
certainty: certain vs. uncertain) x 2 (price of promoted hotel: low vs. high) between-
subjects design. We manipulated the certainty of the promotion by manipulating whether 
the promoted hotel came with a sure discount or with a chance of being entirely free, and 
we held the percentage associated with these promotions constant at 10%. As in Studies 
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1a and 1b, participants learned about the promotion via a note that appeared above the 
hotel screenshots. The wording of this note was the same as in Study 1b, except that the 
name of the hotel was “Econo Lodge." We manipulated the price of the promoted hotel to 
be low or high by manipulating whether we displayed the hotel’s one-night price ($48) or 
the 10-night total ($480). In so doing, we also manipulated the size of the sure discount, 
as it was $4.80 for a one-night price of $48, and $48 for the 10-night price of $480.9 The 
prices of the other two hotels were manipulated accordingly, with one-night prices of $44 
and $42 in the low-price conditions, and 10-night prices of $440 and $420 in the high-
price conditions. 
As in Studies 1a and 1b, we asked participants to indicate which of the three hotels 
they would choose, and we measured whether or not participants chose the promoted 
hotel (1 = they chose the promoted hotel; 0 = they chose one of the other two hotels). At 
the end of the study, we assessed participants’ age and gender. 
 
                                                          
9 Because participants in both conditions were considering a discount of 10%, this manipulation should 
have no effect if consumers’ evaluation of discount size is based entirely on percentages rather than on 
absolute amounts. We think that consumers’ evaluation of discount size is likely to be based partly on their 
evaluation of the size of the percent discount, and partly on the absolute size of the discount (see also Darke 
& Freeman, 1993). For example, we suspect that at least some people would consider a 10% discount off 
the cost of a house to be larger than a 10% discount off the cost of a candy bar. As long as this is true, then 
our manipulation should cause participants to feel that the 10% discount is larger when the original price is 
$480 than when it is $48.  
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Low-Price Condition 
The hotels’ prices are displayed as one-night prices: 
 
High-Price Condition 
The hotels’ prices are displayed as 10-night prices: 
 
  
Figure 4. Stimuli presented in Study 2 (uncertain-promotion condition).  
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Results and Discussion 
Figure 5 displays the results. Participants were more likely to choose the promoted 
hotel when it came with a chance-for-free promotion than when it came with a sure 
discount, b = .057, SE = .021, t(2,301) = 2.76, p = .006, and when the price was low 
($48) than when it was high ($480), b = .041, SE = .021, t(2,301) = 2.01, p = .045. 
However, a significant interaction between the discount certainty condition and the price 
condition, b = .084, SE = .041, t(2,301) = 2.04, p = .041, revealed that the difference 
between the two promotion types was only significant for the low-price condition, b = 
.099, SE = .029, t(1,155) = 3.39, p = .001, but not for the high-price condition, b = .015, 
SE = .029, t(1,145) = .51, p = .609. Thus, the smaller the sure discount, the more likely 
the chance-for-free promotion was to outperform the sure discount. Because the 
percentage associated with the promotion was held constant at 10% in this study, this 
effect cannot be explained by consumers’ overweighting of small probabilities. 
 
Figure 5. Results of Study 2.  
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STUDY 3 
In Study 3, we manipulated the size of the sure discount by manipulating both the 
percentage associated with the promotions and the price of the product. But in this study 
we presented participants with both types of price promotions (i.e., uncertain vs. certain), 
and asked them to choose which one they would prefer. This design allowed us to test 
whether our results would extend to situations in which consumers are asked to directly 
choose between promotion types, the very situations that have been the primary focus of 
past research (Mazar et al., 2017).  
Method 
Participants 
We conducted Study 3 using U.S. participants from Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk 
(MTurk). Participants received $0.50 for participation. We decided in advance to recruit 
900 participants for this study, and we wound up with a final sample of 852 participants 
(average age = 35 years; 52% female). The final sample included all participants who 
indicated their choice, but, as pre-registered, we kept only the first response from IP 
addresses that appeared more than once in the dataset (resulting in 11 exclusions), and we 
excluded any participants whose IP addresses were identical to those of participants in 
Studies 1a, 1b, and 2 (36 participants). 
Procedure 
In this study, we presented participants with only one hotel, namely the promoted 
hotel from Study 2 (i.e., the “Econo Lodge” hotel). We asked participants to imagine that 
they had selected this hotel for an upcoming trip to the Jersey Shore. Participants also 
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learned that the hotel came with one of two types of price promotions and that they could 
choose which type of price promotion they would like to receive. Participants could 
choose between a certain promotion that came in the form of a sure discount (described 
as “receiving X% off of the price of the hotel room”) and an uncertain promotion that 
came in the form of a chance-for-free promotion (described as “an X% chance to get the 
hotel room for free”). Figure 6 shows the stimuli that we used in Study 3. 
We manipulated both the percentage associated with the promotions and the price of 
the promoted hotel. We randomly assigned participants to one of four conditions of a 2 
(promotion percentage: 1% vs. 10%) x 2 (price of promoted hotel: low vs. high) between-
subjects design. We manipulated the percentage associated with the promotions to be 
either 1% or 10%, as we did in Study 1a. And we manipulated the price of the promoted 
hotel to be either the one-night price ($48) or the 10-night price ($480), as we did in 
Study 2. As a consequence, the size of the sure discount varied across conditions, from 48 
cents in the “1%/low price” condition to $48 in the “10%/high price” condition.  
We measured whether or not participants selected the chance-for-free promotion (1 = 
they selected the chance-for-free promotion, 0 = they selected the sure discount). And at 
the end of the study, we assessed participants’ age and gender. 
 
  
 
 
6
2
 
Low-price Condition 
The hotel’s price is the one-night price: 
High-price Condition 
The hotel’s price is the 10-night price: 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Stimuli presented in Study 3 (10% condition). 
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Results and Discussion 
Figure 7 displays the results of Study 3. Participants were more likely to choose the 
chance-for-free promotion over the sure discount when the percentage was 1% than when 
it was 10%, b = .351, SE = .032, t(851) = 11.02, p < .001, and when the price was low 
($48) than when it was high ($480), b = .072, SE = .032, t(851) = 2.27, p = .024. The 
interaction was not significant (p = .462). The results in Figure 7 further show that the 
percentage of participants choosing the chance-for-free promotion was largest when the 
size of the sure discount was smallest ($0.48), and smallest when the size of the sure 
discount was largest ($48). In addition, participants were more likely to prefer a 1% 
chance-for-free promotion to 1% off when the price was $480 than they were to prefer a 
10% chance-for-free promotion to 10% off when the price was $48. This suggests that 
people’s evaluation of the size of discounts might partly be based on the absolute size of 
the discount (which was identical in these conditions: $4.80) and partly based on the 
proportional size of the discount (which is greater when getting 10% off than when 
getting 1% off of the original price). 
Thus, this study again suggests that people are more likely to choose an uncertain 
promotion over a sure discount when the sure discount is smaller, either because the 
percentage associated with the promotions is small or because the price is small. 
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Figure 7. Results of Study 3.  
 
 
 
STUDY 4A 
In Studies 1-3, we manipulated the objective size of the sure discounts by directly 
manipulating features of the promotion itself (its percentage) or of the product for which 
the promotion was offered (the product’s price). In Study 4a, we sought to test whether 
we would observe the same effects by holding the objective size of the sure discounts 
constant, while changing only how large or small those discounts feel. Specifically, we 
tried to make the same sure discount feel smaller by presenting it in the context of a large 
discount.  
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Method 
Participants 
We conducted Study 4a using U.S. participants from Amazon.com’s Mechanical 
Turk (MTurk). Participants received $0.50 for participation. We decided in advance to 
recruit 1,000 participants, and we wound up with a final sample of 984. The final sample 
included all participants who indicated their choice, but, as pre-registered, we kept only 
the first response from IP addresses that appeared more than once in the dataset (resulting 
in 12 exclusions).10 The final sample averaged 36 years of age and was 55% female. 
Procedure. Participants were asked to imagine that they were about to buy a product, 
and that the original price of this product was $11. They also learned that the product 
came with one of two types of promotions, and that they could choose which type of 
promotion they would like to receive. One of the promotions was a 10% sure discount 
described as a dollar amount (i.e., “$1.10 off of the price of the product”), and the other 
was a 10% chance to get the product for free. We presented the two promotions to 
participants in a table and labeled them “Promotion A” and “Promotion B.” We 
randomized the order in which these promotions were presented (i.e., whether the sure 
discount or the chance-for-free promotion was Promotion A). Figure 8 shows the full 
scenario. 
 Importantly, however, before participants saw this scenario and indicated their 
choice for a promotion, we presented them with another scenario (i.e., the context 
scenario). This context scenario was identical to the scenario described above, except that 
                                                          
10 In Studies 4a, 4b, and 5, participants with IP addresses that matched IP addresses in the data sets from 
previous studies were screened out a priori, and thus there was no need to exclude them ex post. 
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we manipulated the price for the product in that scenario (and thus the sure discount that 
came with it). Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions. For 
participants in the “high-context-price” condition, the product in the context scenario was 
priced at $315 (with a sure discount of $31.50), and for participants in the “low-context-
price” condition, the product in the context scenario was priced at $15 (with a sure 
discount of $1.50). As in the focal scenario, participants learned that the product came 
with one of the two types of promotions, and that they could choose which promotion 
they would like to receive. That is, participants made two choices, one for the first 
(context) scenario, and one for the second (focal) scenario. As pre-registered, we used 
participants’ choices in the second, focal scenario as our dependent measure. We 
expected the high-context-price scenario to make the sure discount in the focal scenario 
seem smaller, and thus to increase participants’ tendency to choose the chance-for-free 
promotion in the focal scenario.  
In both the focal scenario and the context scenario, we asked participants to indicate 
which promotion they would like to receive on a 6-point scale that ranged from 1, 
“definitely Promotion A,” to 6, “definitely Promotion B.” Since we randomized the order 
in which the sure discount and the chance-for-free promotion were presented, we scored 
all participants’ answers so that 1 = “definitely sure discount” and 6 = “definitely chance-
for-free promotion.” At the end of the study, we assessed participants’ age and gender.
6
7
 
 
 
 
 
High-context-price Condition  Low-context-price Condition  
Context Scenario: Price is $315 (with a sure discount of $31.50) Context Scenario: Price is $15 (with a sure discount of $1.50) 
  
Focal Scenario: Price is $11 (with a sure discount of $1.10) Focal Scenario: Price is $11 (with a sure discount of $1.10) 
 
 
Figure 8. Stimuli presented in Study 4a.  
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Results and Discussion 
We regressed participants’ ratings of the promotions on the context-price condition. 
As predicted, participants were more likely to prefer a 10% chance to get the $11 product 
for free to the sure discount of $1.10 when they previously made a choice involving a 
$315 product that came with a discount of $31.50 (M = 3.60, SE = .091) than when they 
previously made a choice involving a $15 product that came with a discount of $1.50 (M 
= 2.68, SE = .082), b = .918, SE = .123, t(983) = 7.49, p < .001.11 This result held when 
we controlled for participants’ choices in the first scenario, b = 1.103, SE = .109, t(983) = 
10.15, p < .001. Thus, in line with our hypothesis, our results indicate that people’s 
preferences for chance-for-free promotions increase when the context makes the 
equivalent sure discount seem smaller. 
STUDY 4B 
In Study 4b, we again attempted to manipulate how large or small a sure discount felt 
by manipulating the context. This time, though, we manipulated the context in a way that 
did not require participants to make a previous choice.  
Method 
Participants 
                                                          
11 As pre-registered, we were chiefly interested in participants’ choices in the focal scenario. However, we 
can also analyze participants’ choices in the context scenario. In line with our results from Studies 2 and 3, 
in the context scenario, participants were more likely to prefer the chance-for-free promotion to the sure 
discount when the original price of the product was low ($15; M = 2.68, SE = .079) than when it was high 
($315; M = 2.34, SE = .072), b = .343, SE = .107, t(983) = 3.20, p = .001. 
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We conducted Study 4b using U.S. participants from Amazon.com’s Mechanical 
Turk (MTurk). Participants received $0.50 for participation.12 We decided in advance to 
recruit 1,200 participants, and we wound up with a final sample of 1,188. The final 
sample included all participants who indicated their choice, but, as pre-registered, we 
kept only the first response from IP addresses that appeared more than once in the dataset 
(resulting in 15 exclusions). The final sample averaged 36 years of age and was 54% 
female. 
Procedure. We asked participants to imagine that they had just decided to buy a 1-
year membership to a gym, for which we manipulated the price and the corresponding 
discount, as well as a week’s worth of personal training sessions, for which the price was 
held constant at $50. Participants were asked to indicate whether they would prefer a sure 
discount on the personal training sessions, or an equivalent chance-for-free promotion.  
As in Study 4a, participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions. 
Participants in the “high-context-price” condition learned that the original price of the 
gym membership was $480/year and that they would get $48 off of this price. And 
participants in the “low-context-price” condition learned that the original price of the 
gym membership was $40/month and that they would get $4 off of this price. The price 
for the personal training sessions was held constant at $50. Participants were furthermore 
informed that the personal training sessions came with one of two types of price 
promotions, and that they could choose which price promotion they would like to receive.  
                                                          
12 We initially launched Study 4b with a compensation of $0.30. However, we decided to increase the 
compensation to $0.50 to speed up participant recruitment after about six hours of data collection. 
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Since both the gym membership and the personal training sessions came with a 
promotion, we presented participants with an overview of the price promotion packages 
that they could choose between. This overview always included the sure discount on the 
gym membership, and varied with respect to whether, for the personal training sessions, 
participants received a sure discount (“$5 off of the personal training sessions”) or a 
chance-for-free promotion (“a 10% chance to get the personal training sessions for free”). 
Figure 9 shows the exact wording of the scenario across conditions and the choice 
options that participants faced. We randomized whether the sure discount or the chance-
for-free promotion was presented first.  
We asked participants to indicate which promotion they would like to receive on a 6-
point scale that ranged from 1, “definitely Promotion A,” to 6, “definitely Promotion B.” 
Since we randomized the order in which the sure discount and the chance-for-free 
promotion were presented, we scored participants’ answers so that 1 = “definitely sure 
discount” and 6 = “definitely chance-for-free promotion.” At the end of the study, we 
assessed participants’ age and gender. 
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High-context-price Condition 
The price of the gym membership is stated as $480/year  
(with a sure discount of $48): 
 
 
Low-context-price Condition 
The price of the gym membership is stated as $40/month 
(with a sure discount of $4): 
 
 
Figure 9. Stimulus presented in Study 4b. 
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Results and Discussion 
We regressed participants’ ratings of the promotions on the context-price condition. 
As predicted, participants were more likely to prefer a 10% chance of getting the $50 
personal training sessions for free over a sure discount of $5 when they considered the 
promotions in the context of a $48 discount on the yearly membership price (M = 2.81, 
SE = .078) than when they considered them in the context of a $4 discount on the 
monthly membership price (M = 2.58, SE = .075), b = .229, SE = .108, t(1,187) = 2.12, p 
= .034.  
Taken together, Studies 4a and 4b demonstrate that asking consumers to consider the 
same discount in the context of a larger discount can increase people’s relative preference 
for an uncertain promotion. In the next study, we tested an additional way to manipulate 
how large a sure discount feels, namely by manipulating how the sure discount is framed. 
STUDY 5 
In Study 5, we set out to examine whether framing the sure discount as a percentage 
(e.g., 10% off of $50) or a dollar amount (e.g., $5 off of $50) alters people’s likelihood of 
choosing an uncertain chance-for-free promotion over an equivalent sure discount. In 
Studies 1a-4b, we established that the perceived size of a sure discount drives people’s 
preferences for uncertain promotions. Thus, if the perceived size of a sure discount is 
affected by whether the sure discount is presented as a percentage or a dollar amount, 
then this should also affect people’s preferences for uncertain promotions. 
Prior work suggests that how a discount is framed may change how large it is 
perceived to be (e.g., Chen, Monroe, & Lou, 1998; Della Bitta, Monroe, & McGinnis, 
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1981; DelVecchio, Krishnan, & Smith, 2007; González, Eduardo, Roggeveen, & Grewal, 
2016). However, this research provides inconsistent results with respect to the direction 
of the effect. For example, research by Della Bitta, Monroe, and McGinnis (1981) 
suggests that framing a sure discount as a dollar amount leads to higher savings 
perceptions than framing it as a percentage. More recently, Chen, Monroe, and Lou 
(1998) found that dollar framing increased saving perceptions for high-priced products, 
but percentage framing increased savings perceptions for low-priced products. However, 
they did not find any effect on a measure of purchase intentions. Similarly, González et 
al. (2016) found that dollar framing resulted in both higher saving perceptions and higher 
purchase intentions for high-priced products, whereas percentage framing directionally, 
but not significantly, increased saving perceptions and purchase intentions for low-priced 
products. Given that these findings are inconsistent and somewhat complicated, we 
conducted a pretest to examine whether a percentage (vs. dollar) framing would make a 
sure discount feel larger or smaller. The results from this pretest informed our predictions 
for the main study. 
Pretest 
We conducted a pretest to examine whether participants perceive the size of a sure 
discount to be different depending on whether the discount is framed as a percentage or 
as a dollar amount, and depending on the price of the product.  
Participants 
We conducted the pretest on Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Participants 
received $0.30 for participation. We decided in advance to recruit 900 participants for 
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this pretest, and we wound up with a final sample of 867 participants (average age = 36 
years; 48% female). The final sample included all participants who provided their rating, 
but, as pre-registered, we kept only the first response from IP addresses that appeared 
more than once in the dataset (resulting in 20 exclusions), and we excluded any 
participants whose IP addresses were identical to those of participants in Studies 1a-3 (18 
participants). 
Procedure 
Participants were asked to imagine that they were about to buy a product and that the 
product came with a sure discount equal to 10% off. We randomly assigned participants 
to one of four conditions of a 2 (price of promoted product: low vs. high) x 2 (framing of 
sure discount: percentage vs. dollar amount) between-subjects design. The original price 
of the product was $11 in the low-price condition and $311 in the high price condition. 
Furthermore, the discount was either framed as a percentage off of the original price (e.g., 
“You will get 10% off of the price of the product.”) or as a dollar amount (e.g., “You will 
get $1.10 off of the price of the product.”). We asked participants to indicate how small 
or large the discount felt to them (1 = very small; 7 = very large). 
Results 
Figure 11, Panel A displays the results of this pretest. Not surprisingly, participants 
rated the sure discount as smaller in the low-price condition than in the high-price 
condition, b = -.276, SE = .091, t(866) = -3.03, p = .003. More importantly, they rated the 
discount as smaller when it was framed as a percentage off of the original price than 
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when it was framed as a dollar amount, b = -.621, SE = .091, t(866) = -6.80, p < .001. The 
interaction was not significant (p = .801).  
Thus, the framing of the sure discount influenced its perceived size, even though the 
sure discount always corresponded to getting 10% off of the original price of the product. 
This pretest suggests that, because a sure discount feels smaller when it is framed as a 
percentage than when it is framed as a dollar amount, people should be more likely to 
choose a chance-for-free promotion over a sure discount when the latter is framed as a 
percentage than when it is framed as a dollar amount. We tested this prediction in Study 
5.  
Method 
Participants 
We conducted Study 5 using U.S. participants from Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk 
(MTurk). Participants received $0.30 for participation. We decided in advance to recruit 
2,500 participants for this study, and we wound up with a final sample of 2,371 
participants (average age = 36 years; 52% female). The final sample included all 
participants who chose a discount, but, as pre-registered, we kept only the first response 
from IP addresses that appeared more than once in the dataset (resulting in 28 
exclusions).  
Procedure 
In this study, we asked participants to imagine that they were about to buy a product 
that came with one of two types of promotions, and that they could choose which 
promotion they would like to receive. We randomly assigned participants to one of four 
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conditions from a 2 (price of promoted product: low vs. high) x 2 (framing of sure 
discount: percentage vs. dollar amount) between-subjects design. In line with our pretest, 
in the low-price condition the original price of the product was $11, and in the high price 
condition, it was $311.  
Participants then received information about the two types of price promotions. One 
of the price promotions was a chance-for-free promotion (“a 10% chance to get the 
product for free”), and the other was a sure discount that corresponded to getting 10% off 
of the price of the product. However, we manipulated whether this sure discount was 
presented as a percentage (i.e., 10% off) or as the equivalent dollar amount (i.e., $1.10 off 
in the low-price condition and $31.10 off in the high-price condition). Figure 10 shows 
the exact wording of the scenario and the choice option that participants faced. We 
randomized whether the sure discount or the chance-for-free promotion was displayed 
first (i.e., which promotion was Promotion A).  
We asked participants to indicate which price promotion they would like to receive 
on a 6-point scale that ranged from 1 = “definitely Promotion A” to 6 = “definitely 
Promotion B.” Since we randomized the order in which the sure discount and the chance-
for-free promotion were presented, we scored participants’ answers so that 1 = “definitely 
sure discount” to 6 = “definitely chance-for-free promotion.” At the end of the study, we 
assessed participants’ age and gender. 
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Percentage-Framing Condition 
The sure discount is presented as a percentage (10% off): 
 
 
Dollar-Framing Condition 
The sure discount is presented as a dollar amount ($1.10 off): 
 
Figure 10. Stimulus presented in Study 5. 
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Results and Discussion 
Figure 11, Panel B displays the results of Study 5. Consistent with our previous 
studies, participants were more likely to choose the chance-for-free promotion over the 
sure discount when the price was low (and the sure discount was smaller) than when it 
was high (and the sure discount was larger), b = .241, SE = .075, t(2,370) = 3.20, p = 
.001. More importantly and in line with the predictions derived from our pretest, 
participants were also more likely to choose the chance-for-free promotion over the sure 
discount when the sure discount was framed as a percentage than when it was framed as a 
dollar amount, b = .523, SE = .075, t(2,370) = 6.94, p < .001. The interaction was 
significant as well, b = .352, SE = .151, t(2,370) = 2.34, p = .019, such that the framing of 
the sure discount had a larger effect in the low-price condition, b = .699, SE = .111, 
t(1,183) = 6.29, p < .001, than in the high-price condition, b = .347, SE = .102, t(1,186) = 
3.41, p = .001. Further supporting our hypothesis, a comparison of Panels A and B in 
Figure 11 shows that people were most likely to prefer the chance-for-free promotion in 
the condition in which the sure discount was rated the smallest (i.e., when the price was 
$11 and the sure discount was framed as a percentage), and least likely to prefer the 
chance-for-free promotion in the condition in which the sure discount was rated the 
largest (i.e., when the price was $311 and the sure discount was framed as a dollar 
amount). Thus, the results from this study suggest that we can alter people’s preferences 
for uncertain promotions simply by changing whether the sure discount is framed as a 
percentage or as a dollar amount. 
 
 79 
 
 
Panel A: 
Participants’ Rating of the Sure Discount in the Pretest for Study 5 
 
Panel B:  
Participants’ Preference for the Chance-For-Free Promotion in Study 5 
 
 
Figure 11. Results of Study 5: Panel A shows the results of the pretest for Study 
5 and Panel B shows the results of Study 5. 
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GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Is it more effective to offer customers an uncertain price promotion, such as an X% 
chance to get the product for free, or to provide them with a sure discount of equal 
expected value? In this article, we provide evidence that the answer to this question 
depends on the actual or perceived size of the sure discount. Across seven studies, we 
found that uncertain price promotions are more effective than sure discounts of equal 
expected value when those sure discounts are or seem small. Specifically, we showed that 
uncertain promotions are relatively more effective when the percentage associated with 
the promotions is smaller (Studies 1a, 1b, and 3), when the original price of the product is 
smaller (Studies 2, 3, and 5), when the sure discounts are made to feel smaller by 
presenting them alongside a larger discount (Studies 4a and 4b), and when the sure 
discounts are made to feel smaller by framing them as a percentage-discount rather than a 
dollar amount (Study 5).  
These findings are inconsistent with two leading explanations for consumers’ 
preferences for uncertain over certain promotions. First, diminishing sensitivity cannot 
explain these findings, because, as reviewed in the Introduction, diminishing sensitivity 
implies that consumers will always prefer uncertain chance-for-free promotions to sure 
discounts of equal expected value (Mazar et al., 2017). Second, it is worth noting that 
these findings cannot be explained by consumers’ overweighting of small probabilities, 
as we showed that consumers’ preferences for uncertain promotions are increased by 
manipulations that hold the probability of the uncertain promotion constant while making 
the sure discount seem smaller (e.g., by displaying it as a percentage rather than a dollar 
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amount). Indeed, our findings suggest that people’s preferences for uncertainty are more 
strongly tethered to their perceptions of the size of the sure outcome than they are to their 
perceptions of the probability of getting the uncertain reward. If true, this suggests that 
phenomena that have been long explained in terms of probability weighting, such as 
people’s willingness to purchase lottery tickets and/or insurance (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979), may be better explained in terms of people’s perceptions of the size of the sure 
amount that they are asked to pay. For example, a $1 payment for a lottery ticket may 
seem trivially small to a consumer who is considering the many millions she could stand 
to win. Similarly, a $750 life insurance premium may seem small to a consumer who is 
considering how much the million-dollar policy will pay out.  
Although Mazar, Shampanier, and Ariely (2017) favored a diminishing sensitivity 
explanation for the fact that participants in their studies showed a preference for uncertain 
promotions over sure discounts of equal expected value, almost all of their studies used 
low-priced products, and thus small sure discounts. For example, their Experiment 1 
investigated a discount on a $0.75 candy bar, and their Experiment 2 investigated a 
discount on a $4.50 DVD rental. Although consumers’ tendency to prefer the uncertain 
promotion in their investigation of the $4.50 DVD rental led Mazar, Shampanier, and 
Ariely (2017) to “conclude that our findings are less likely an artifact of the ‘peanuts’ 
effect” (p. 256), any discount on a good priced so low is likely to seem small to 
consumers. The only studies in Mazar, Shampanier, and Ariely’s (2017) investigation 
that used a high-priced product were Studies 5a and 5b, in which the promoted product 
was a hotel priced at $200/night with a sure discount of 10% (i.e., $20). Although they 
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did find that the 10% chance-for-free promotion was more effective than a the 10% sure 
discount in these studies, they also found, in Study 5a, that the sure discount was no more 
effective than no discount at all. Because we were surprised by this result, we decided to 
try to replicate it. The details are in the Supplement. We found that the sure discount was 
more effective than no discount at getting participants to purchase the promoted $200 
hotel, but, most importantly, we also found that the chance-for-free promotion was not 
more effective than the sure discount. Thus, as we would expect from our theorizing, a 
fairly sizable sure discount of $20 on a $200 product was not less effective than a 10% 
chance to get the product for free. 
Since our theorizing hinges on people’s perceptions of the size of sure discounts, it is 
important to consider what it is that guides these perceptions. Although we are very far 
from having an exhaustive answer to this question, we can say that these perceptions are 
likely to be driven by both absolute sizes and relative sizes (see also Darke & Freedman, 
1993). Thus, people will judge the same percentage discount to be larger when the 
product is more highly priced, so that 10% off of a car feels larger than 10% off of a 
candy bar. At the same time, people will judge the same absolute discount to be smaller 
when the product is more highly priced, so that a $1 discount on a car feels smaller than a 
$1 discount on a candy bar. For any given evaluation both effects may be in place, and 
which of these effects is larger or smaller is likely to depend on the context and on the 
individual.  
In sum, our research suggests that people’s preferences for uncertain promotions over 
sure discounts heavily depend on the perceived size of the sure discount. This simple fact 
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has widespread implications, both theoretically and practically. One practical implication 
is this: Uncertain price promotions are probably a good idea if you are selling candy bars, 
but a bad idea if you are selling cars.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Appendix A: Links to Pre-registrations for Chapter 1 
Study 1: https://aspredicted.org/2rp5k.pdf 
Study 2: https://aspredicted.org/u6442.pdf 
Study 3: https://aspredicted.org/4b8j8.pdf 
Study 4: https://aspredicted.org/ga8xg.pdf 
Study 5: https://aspredicted.org/ni7zv.pdf 
Study 6: https://aspredicted.org/758ba.pdf 
Study 7: https://aspredicted.org/qi57c.pdf 
Study 8: https://aspredicted.org/zf6qi.pdf 
Study 9: https://aspredicted.org/4tc3d.pdf 
Study S1: https://aspredicted.org/kg4zt.pdf 
Study S2: https://aspredicted.org/ir7eu.pdf 
 
 
Appendix B: Links to Pre-registrations for Chapter 2 
Study 1a: http://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=g66g5c  
Study 1b: https://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=zp2sn6  
Study 2: http://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=27v2qa  
Study 3: https://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=yr2uh9  
Study 4a: https://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=tq7v9x  
Study 4b: http://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=ze3sg6  
Study 5 Pretest: https://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=iz5qj2  
Study 5: https://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=ry3n54  
Study S1: http://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=se2eg6  
 
 
Appendix C: Content of the Web Appendix for Chapter 2 
The Web Appendix contains the procedure and results for Study S1 and is available at 
this link: https://osf.io/3azsn/?view_only=a7c2c3cedd4e4b65b20a3e8116e2cb9e 
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